§ 33.06 Present Mental Condition: FRE 803(3)
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Rule 803(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for statements of present physical or mental condition. The latter includes statements concerning motive, intent, or plan. Rule 803's application to statements of physical condition (e.g., mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is discussed in the next section.
Rationale. There are no memory problems because the statement is made contemporaneously with the mental condition, and there is little risk of misperceiving one's own thoughts. Moreover, the statement is often more reliable than later trial testimony.50Practical necessity is also a factor; a person's state of mind is often a material fact under the substantive law, and a statement concerning that state of mind may be the only evidence of that subjective mental state.
Nonhearsay. Frequently, statements regarding the mental state of the declarant are not hearsay because they are not offered for the truth. For example, a declarant's statement in a homicide prosecution, "John Doe is the most despicable person in the world," offered to prove motive (and ultimately intent), is not offered to prove the truth of the assertion and is, therefore, not hearsay. In contrast, the statement, "I will kill John Doe," offered to prove intent, is hearsay but falls within the exception of Rule 803(3).51
Types of statements. For analysis, the discussion is divided into three categories: (1) statements of present state of mind offered to prove that state of mind, (2) statements of present state of mind offered to prove future conduct, and (3) statements reflecting belief about past events. These categories are discussed below.
[A] To Prove a State of Mind That Is a Material Fact
Under Rule 803(3), statements of presently existing state of mind are excepted from the hearsay rule52—for example, the statement "I am depressed" in a suicide case. Statements made by an accused may be offered under this exception to show that the accused did not have the requisite mens rea.53 (Prosecutors do not need to resort to this exception because any statement made by the accused and offered by the prosecution qualifies as a statement ("admission") of a party-opponent.54)
Victim's state of mind. In some cases, statements concerning a homicide victim's fear of the defendant have been admitted—e.g., "I am afraid of Frank." These decisions are problematic. The statement does reflect the victim's state of mind and thus satisfies Rule 803(3). However, the victim's state of mind is rarely a material issue.55 The defendant's, not the victim's, state of mind is an element in a homicide case.56 Consequently, the statement is ordinarily irrelevant, and its use may circumvent the hearsay rule because of the obvious inference that a past threat was made, or that other conduct produced the fear. In contrast, a victim's statement of fear is material when the defendant raises a defense of accident57 or when consent is an issue.58
[B] To Prove Future Conduct: Hillmon Doctrine
Statements of present state of mind are also admissible to prove that the declarant subsequently acted in accordance with that state of mind. For example, a declarant's statement, "I will revoke my will," is admissible to show that the declarant subsequently revoked that will. Such statements are less reliable proof of future conduct than of present intent because people frequently do not or cannot carry out their intentions. This, however, is a relevancy concern which is left to the jury.59
The leading case is Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon,60 in which the insurance company argued that a body found at Crooked Creek, Kansas, was that of Walters, not the insured, Hillmon. Letters in which Walters (the declarant) stated that he intended to travel from Wichita to Crooked Creek with Hillmon were offered in evidence. The Supreme Court upheld their admissibility:
The letters were competent not as narratives of facts communicated to the writer by others, nor yet as proof that he actually went away from Wichita, but as evidence that, shortly before the time when other evidence tended to show that he went away, he had the intention of going, and of going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both that he did go and that he went with Hillmon than if there had been no proof of such intention.61
In terms of the hearsay dangers, there were no perception or memory problems associated with Walters' statements; hence, admissibility makes sense under the state of mind exception. As noted above, however, the problem of relevancy remains: How probative are such statements as proof of future conduct?
Joint conduct. Statements offered to prove that a person other than the declarant also engaged in the intended conduct (e.g., that Hillmon accompanied the declarant to Crooked Creek) are problematic. It is one thing to admit the statement to show Walters' future conduct, but to use it to prove a...
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