§ 32.07 Larceny: Intent to Steal (Animus Furandi)
[A] Nature of the Felonious Intent
[1] In General
Courts commonly state that a person is not guilty of larceny unless he takes and carries away the personal property of another with the "specific intent to steal" the property. In this context, "intent to steal" is a shorthand way of describing the felonious intent of larceny, which is the intent to deprive another person permanently of the property.67 Thus, D is guilty of larceny if he trespassorily drives away in V's automobile, with the intent of keeping the car. However, he is not guilty of larceny (although he may be guilty of a statutory offense of "joyriding"), if he intends to keep the vehicle temporarily and then return it.68
It should be observed that the felonious intent of larceny is animus furandi (intent to deprive), not lucri causa (for the sake of gain). That is, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that the thief intended to obtain personal benefit from the taking.69 For example, if D takes and carries away V's valuable vase with the intention of destroying it, he has committed larceny although he may gain nothing (except some nonpecuniary pleasure) from the act. On the other hand, if D takes V's framed college diploma off the wall and carries it away with the purpose of using it temporarily to fraudulently obtain money from another, D is not guilty of larceny of the diploma although he has taken it for personal gain.
It follows from this, as well, that the nature of the property taken can be relevant in determining whether a person has acted with the requisite felonious intent. For example, if property is perishable, an intent to deprive the victim of the property long enough to "appropriate a major portion of its economic value"70 constitutes the requisite "permanent" deprivation.71
[2] Recklessly Depriving Another of Property Permanently
Courts will frequently uphold a conviction for larceny in circumstances in which the most accurate characterization of the defendant's mental state is that he knew that his conduct would create a substantial risk of permanent loss, i.e., that the actor was guilty of recklessly exposing the property to permanent loss. Although this is a different mens rea than "intent to steal," many courts treat these two states of mind alike or, at least, infer the felonious intent from the actor's recklessness.72
For example, D1 is guilty of the larceny of a car if he trespassorily takes V's vehicle in City X, with the intention of driving it to City Y and abandoning it there.73 Although D1 may hope that the abandoned car will eventually be returned to V, he knows there is a very high likelihood that it will be re-stolen or its component parts taken before it can be recovered. D1's recklessness in this regard is enough to justify a larceny conviction. Similarly, the intent to steal may be inferred if D2 takes property which does not belong to him with the intention of "selling" the property back to its owner or returning it only if he is paid a reward.74
[B] Concurrence of Mens Rea and Actus Reus
[1] In General
A larceny does not occur unless the actor possesses the intent to steal the property at the time of commission of the actus reus of larceny. For example, if D takes and drives away V's car, intending to steal it, D has committed larceny. On the other hand, if D obtains permission to use V's automobile for the day and, hours later, decides to abscond with it, he is not guilty of larceny, because he did not have the felonious intent at the moment he took possession of the car.
[2] Continuing-Trespass Doctrine
As in other aspects of larceny law, common law judges created a legal fiction to deal with certain circumstances in which the concurrence requirement seemingly prevented conviction for larceny. For example, suppose that D nonconsensually takes V's car with the intention of keeping it for just one day and then return it. Hours later, D decides to keep the automobile permanently and drives out of town...
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