§ 3.3.1.8 Appeals Relating To Defaults and Default Judgments.

• Jurisdiction: Arizona

§ 3.3.1.8 Appeals Relating To Defaults and Default Judgments. Orders setting aside or refusing to set aside the clerk’s entry of a party’s default are not appealable. See Sanders v. Cobble, 154 Ariz. 474, 476, 744 P.2d 1, 3 (1987); Master Fin., Inc. v. Woodburn, 208 Ariz. 70, 72, & 5, 90 P.3d 1236, 1238 (App. 2004). However, special action relief may be available in the default context. See Appellate Court Special Actions § 7.3.6.3.4. In Richas v. Superior Court (Motorola, Inc.), 133 Ariz. 512, 652 P.2d 1035 (1982), the supreme court accepted special action jurisdiction to review a trial court order vacating an entry of default. The court there cited Shemaitis v. Superior Court (Salvation Army), 114 Ariz. 288, 560 P.2d 806 (App. 1976), a decision which speaks of setting aside an entry of default but concerns an order which appeared to set aside both an entry of default and a default judgment.

Hirsch v. Nat’l Van Lines, Inc., 136 Ariz. 304, 311-12, 666 P.2d 49, 56-57 (1983), confirms the general rule there also is no right of appeal from a default judgment itself. Instead, the primary remedy is a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(c). See also Ezell v. Quon, 224 Ariz. 532, 534, ¶¶ 13, 15, 233 P.3d 645, 647 (App. 2010) (motion to set aside default judgment required before filing appeal); Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564, 212 P.3d 902 (App. 2009).

Orders granting or refusing to grant motions to set aside default judgments repeatedly have been held appealable as special orders made after judgment pursuant to A.R.S. §...