A. [§ 3.159] Actual Malice Standard for Public Officials and Public Figures

• Jurisdiction: Maryland

A. [§ 3.159] Actual Malice Standard for Public Officials and Public Figures

Federal constitutional law interpreting the First Amendment has reshaped common law defamation. First Amendment concerns have required a greater burden of proof for plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures, requiring them to prove fault by an "actual malice" standard. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)). There are three types of public figures: (1) "involuntary public figures," who become public figures through no purposeful action of their own; (2) "all-purpose public figures," who achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that they become public figures for all purposes and in all contexts; and (3) "limited-purpose public figures" who voluntarily inject themselves into a particular public controversy and thereby become public figures for a limited range of issues. Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (interpreting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)). To become a public figure for a "limited range of issues," one must voluntarily inject oneself or be drawn into a particular public controversy. Therefore, a limited-purpose public figure is essentially one who has assumed a "role of public prominence in the broad question of concern." Wells, 186 F.3d at 505. Courts have devised a five-factor test to determine whether the plaintiff has thrust himself into a controversy to the extent necessary to trigger...