§ 24.03 The Road to Miranda: Escobedo v. Illinois

• Jurisdiction: United States

§ 24.03 The Road to Miranda: Escobedo v. Illinois

The road to Miranda runs through Escobedo v. Illinois.²⁷ In Escobedo, E, under arrest for murder, was taken into custody late in the evening and interrogated at the police station. During the questioning, he was handcuffed and kept standing.

At various times during the interrogation, E asked to consult with his privately retained lawyer, but his requests were refused on the false ground that his lawyer "didn't want to see" him. The truth was that shortly after the questioning began, E's counsel arrived at the station, but he was not permitted to talk to his client because, as one officer candidly put it, "they hadn't completed questioning."

Later in the night, the police suggested to E that he confront X, an accomplice who (according to the police) had implicated E as the triggerman. E agreed to talk to X in their presence. During the encounter, E made statements to X that, for the first time, indicated his familiarity with the crime. Later, E made additional statements to the police implicating himself as an accomplice. At no time was E informed by the police of his privilege against self-incrimination.

E sought to exclude his statements on the basis that they were coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause, but the trial court found that they were voluntarily given. E was convicted. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the confession was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of E's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Escobedo was path-breaking. Never before had the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied to one against whom criminal proceedings had not yet formally commenced, such as by indictment. Speaking for the Court, Justice Arthur Goldberg stated that the fact that E had not been indicted when the statements were obtained was irrelevant because, "[w]hen [E] requested, and was denied, an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation . . ." By that time, the investigation had "focused" on E; for all practical purposes he had become the accused.

The Court observed that E, who purportedly had no prior criminal record, undoubtedly was unaware that his admissions of complicity were legally as damaging as an admission that he had fired the fatal shot. Therefore, he needed the "guiding hand of counsel" to advise him "in this delicate situation." According to Escobedo, it "would exalt form over substance to make the...