§ 2-8 Involuntary Manslaughter

• Library: South Carolina Requests to Charge - Criminal (SCBar) (2023 Ed.)

§ 2-8 Involuntary Manslaughter

By this indictment, the State of South Carolina charges the defendant with involuntary manslaughter.

Involuntary manslaughter is (1) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in an unlawful activity that is not a felony and does not naturally tend to cause death or great bodily harm; OR (2) the unintentional killing of another without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Unintentional means the defendant did not intend for anyone to be killed or seriously injured.

The law defines involuntary manslaughter as the unintentional killing of another without malice, express or implied, by some act or omission constituting criminal negligence.

Section 16-3-60 of the South Carolina Code of Laws provides:

With regard to the crime of involuntary manslaughter, criminal negligence is defined as the reckless disregard of the safety of others. A person charged with the crime of involuntary manslaughter may be convicted only upon a showing of criminal negligence as defined in this section.

A reckless disregard for the safety of others signifies an indifference to the consequences of one's acts. It means something more than mere negligence or carelessness, which indicates inadvertence, that is, the failure to exercise due care, sometimes called ordinary care, meaning such care as a person of ordinary reason and prudence would exercise in the same circumstances. Recklessness, willfulness and wantonness, which convey the same general idea, mean a conscious failure to exercise due care or ordinary care. Willfulness is the fact or quality of acting purposely or by design.

Recklessness exists where one who is aware that ordinary care or prudence requires him or her to use certain precautions for the safety of others, with unconcern or indifference fails to use them, or who, aware that a course of conduct or act is negligent, with unconcern or indifference follows such course or does such act. This signifies an indifference to the consequences of one's acts.

Criminal negligence is defined within the law as the reckless disregard of the safety of others. Mere negligence will not suffice to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter. The burden is upon the State to prove heedlessness or willfulness. Recklessness implies the doing of a negligent act knowingly. When a person acts negligently and realizes that he or she is acting negligently, the law says that he or she is reckless, heedless or willful and wanton. Involuntary manslaughter involves an unintentional killing that is accomplished by means of some intentional act.

The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's act was the proximate cause of death. Criminal negligence of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the death. What constitutes criminal negligence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Proximate cause is the direct cause. It is the efficient cause. It is that cause without which the death of the victim would not have resulted. There must be a chain of causation from the time of the injury inflicted by the defendant until the time of the victim's death. Proximate cause does not necessarily mean that it occurred immediately prior to death.

There may be more than one proximate cause. The acts of two or more persons may combine together to be a proximate cause of the death of a person. The defendant's act may be regarded as the proximate cause if it is a contributing cause of the death of the victim. The fact that other causes also contribute to the death of the victim does not relieve the defendant from responsibility. The defendant's act need not be the sole cause of the death, but must be a proximate cause contributing to the death of the victim.

It is not a defense to show that the victim might have recovered had he or she been treated according to the most approved surgical or medical standards or as a reasonably prudent doctor would have treated in the case or even by showing that the treatment was negligent. If, however, the death was caused not by the wound or the injury that the victim had, but was caused by the gross, erroneous, willful, deliberate treatment, the defendant would not be liable. Negligence on the part of someone else would not relieve the defendant from liability if the injury was the proximate cause of the victim's death. However, gross negligence or intentional activity on the part of the practitioners would relieve the defendant of liability. The propriety of the medical procedures is an integral question in determining causation.

? State v. Scott, 414 S.C. 482, 488, 779 S.E.2d 529, 532 (2015) (Acknowledging "that under Scott's version of the facts, the evidence supported a self-defense instruction, which he received. However, on appeal, Scott attempts to argue that he was also entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction because the jury could have inferred that he acted recklessly in self-defense.") ("We recently rejected this argument in State v. Sams, wherein the defendant 'argue[d] that he acted lawfully in self-defense, but that he perhaps acted excessively and recklessly in doing so.'") (citing State v. Sams, 410 S.C. 303, 314, 764 S.E.2d 511, 517 (2014)) ("We found that argument 'tantamount to imperfect self-defense,' which is a doctrine that 'South Carolina has not expressly adopted.'") (Scott, 414 S.C at 488, 779 S.E.2d at 532) (citations omitted)). ("Moreover, we noted that 'even if this Court were to accept the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, it is of no consequence to [the defendant's] proceeding as it would, at most, entitle him to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, which he already received.'") (Id. (quoting Sams, 410 S.C. at 316, 764 S.E.2d at 517)). In State v. Sams, the Court expounded on the doctrine of imperfect self-defense stating "[h]eretofore, South Carolina has not expressly adopted the doctrine of imperfect self-defense." Id. at 315, 764 S.E.2d at 517 (See generally State v. Finley, 277 S.C. 548, 551, 290 S.E.2d 808, 809 (1982) ("observing, in a case discussing the elements of self-defense, that the theory of 'imperfect self-defense,' which reduces an offense from murder to voluntary manslaughter, 'is not the law in South Carolina'"). "In addition, Sams asserts it as a means to entitle him to a charge on involuntary manslaughter. This Court has previously noted, however, that '[a] claim of imperfect self-defense . . . has no application to involuntary manslaughter.'" Id. (quoting Douglas v. State, 332 S.C. 67, 75 fn. 4, 504 S.E.2d 307, 311 fn. 4 (1998)). "Moreover, the view taken in most treatises and jurisdictions that have discussed the imperfect self-defense doctrine is that it serves to reduce a charge of murder to voluntary manslaughter (not involuntary manslaughter)." Id. at 315-16, 764 S.E.2d at 517 (citing Roy Moreland, The Law of Homicide 93 (1952); 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 110 (2006); see also State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 483 A.2d 759 (1984) (stating self-defense is a complete defense to either murder or manslaughter that results in the acquittal of the defendant, whereas imperfect self-defense is not a complete defense, but is instead a factor in mitigation that reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter)). "Thus, even if this Court were to accept the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, it is of no consequence to Sams's proceeding as it would, at most, entitle him to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, which he already received." Sams, 410 S.C. at 316, 764 S.E.2d at 517.

? State v. Scott, 408 S.C. 21, 757 S.E.2d 533, 535 (Ct. App. 2014) (Upholding the trial court's refusal to charge involuntary manslaughter where the defendant claimed "he unintentionally caused Nelson's death while engaged in the lawful activity of self-defense with reckless disregard for her safety.") (The court found "no basis to conclude Scott acted recklessly because if he was justified in defending himself with the martial arts move, there is no ground on which to find he did so recklessly.") Id. (See State v. Gibson, 390 S.C. 347, 355-56, 701 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The evidence presented at trial determines the law to be charged . . . .")). ("Scott premises his argument—that performing the martial arts move was reckless—on his belief that the 'shiny and silver' object Nelson pulled from her pocket was a knife. He argues he exceeded the amount of justifiable force because the combination of his action and the presence of the knife created a danger to Nelson that could support a jury finding that he consciously disregarded the risk his conduct created.") Id. (See State v. Brayboy, 387 S.C. 174, 180, 691 S.E.2d 482, 485 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Recklessness is a state of mind in which the actor is aware of his or her conduct...