§ 2.10 Court Action

• Library: Illinois DUI and Traffic-Related Decisions (2016 Ed.)

§ 2.10 Court Action

§ 2.10-1(a) Charges Dismissed Improperly

People v. Boras, 195 Ill. App. 3d 696, 553 N.E.2d 43, 142 Ill. Dec. 693 (1st Dist. 1990). A trial court dismissed a traffic citation for DUI because the party designation had not been made on the ticket, the offense was described as DUI, and the traffic conditions were not specified. The appellate court reversed finding that any objection to the sufficiency of a uniform traffic ticket must be made prior to trial. If not done prior to trial, a uniform traffic citation is considered to be sufficient.

People v. Camp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 815 N.E.2d 980, 287 Ill. Dec. 336 (2d Dist. 2004). Defendant was charged with DUI. During discovery it was noted that a videotape of defendant performing field sobriety tests was lost. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges because he could not receive a fair trial. The circuit court dismissed the charge with leave to reinstate if the tape was recovered. The State appealed claiming the dismissal of the charges was an excessive sanction for an inadvertent loss of the tape.

The appellate court reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The court agreed with the State's argument on appeal that the tape was not essential or outcome determinative for the DUI case. Although the tape may be important to the defendant and its loss prejudicial to him, the tape itself did not give rise to the DUI charge itself. The court found that due process did not require that the charges against defendant be dismissed. The court remanded the matter for the circuit court to consider alternative sanctions upon the State, one of them being that the jury be instructed that the absence of the videotape allows an inference that the tape's contents were favorable to the defendant.

§ 2.10-1(b) Dismissal Based on Speedy Trial Improper

People v. Erickson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 273, 639 N.E.2d 979, 203 Ill. Dec. 430 (2d Dist. 1994). Defendant was charged with DUI. Subsequently the State, in an Information charged defendant with two counts of DUI. Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, which was denied. Defendant then successfully moved to bar the State from using testimony defendant had given in a civil proceeding. The State unsuccessfully appealed the trial court's order barring that testimony.

The State refiled the DUI charges some 133 days after the mandate from the appellate court was issued. Defendant moved to dismiss the information pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b), alleging more than 160 days of continuances were not attributable to defendant. The trial court granted the dismissal. The appellate court reversed finding the entire time that was used by the trial court to rule on defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence was attributable to defendant. Additionally, defendant failed to properly make a speedy trial demand under 103-5(b) because he demanded trial in the appearance form of defense counsel instead of in the title or heading of a pleading containing that demand.

People v. Huff, 195 Ill. 2d 87, 744 N.E.2d 841, 253 Ill. Dec. 108 (2001). Defendant was charged with DUI, failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, and failure to wear a seat belt. On October 15, 1996, defense counsel filed a demand for trial within 120 days of the date he was taken into custody and if he was not taken into custody or posts a bond and is released from custody at any point after his arrest, he further demanded a jury trial within 160 days of the date of the demand. A jury trial scheduled for February 19, 1997, however an oral motion to continue the trial was made by defense counsel. The next jury date was May 5, 1997 but the cases did not go to trial. On July 14, 1997, defense counsel moved to dismiss alleging that the circuit court set the cases for July 28, 1997, instead of May 5, 1997. The trial judge granted the motion. On appeal, the appellate court in an unpublished opinion reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings, finding that defense counsel failed to make specific reference to section 103-5(b) of the Criminal Code in the demand for trial.

On remand, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges, alleging counsel was ineffective when he failed to prepare a proper speedy trial demand. The trial court granted the dismissal. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal finding the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that that counsel's error here was a serious one and that defendant was prejudiced. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's order on January 29, 2001. The matter was remanded for further proceedings to determine if the trial court's calculation was correct as to the delays and who was responsible for the delays. The Supreme Court also found the demand for trial was properly made and did not agree with an appellate court decision (People v. Ground, 257 Ill. App. 3d 956 (1994)); that stated a demand for trial must cite section 103-5(b) to be effective.

§ 2.10-1(c) Charge Dismissed Properly

People v. Schaeffer, 274 Ill. App. 3d 450, 654 N.E.2d 267, 210 Ill. Dec. 968 (2d Dist. 1995). Defendant was charged with DUI based on his operation of a bicycle. A trial court dismissed the charge, finding that a bicycle was not a vehicle as defined under section 1-217 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. The appellate court affirmed, finding section 11-501 (a)(2) of the vehicle code did not apply to bicycles.

People v. Williams, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 723 N.E.2d 852, 243 Ill. Dec. 549 (2d Dist. 2000). Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of DUI. Due to a scheduling error, four years passed from the time of the conviction and the State's request for a sentencing hearing. The trial judge granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal.

A trial court may not indefinitely postpone post-trial proceedings, including sentencing. Public policy and the effective enforcement of the criminal law require reasonable promptness where specific time limitations are not imposed. An undue delay between the entry of judgment and the execution of the sentence deprives the sentencing court of jurisdiction. Whether a delay is so unreasonable that it deprives the court of its authority to proceed depends on the circumstances, and a delay is not unreasonable if the defendant causes it. The trial court's ruling that defendant was not responsible for the delay was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. A trial court has the inherent authority to dismiss a charge when an unreasonable delay clearly violates a defendant's due process rights.

§ 2.10-2 Collateral Estoppel Applied Improperly

People v. Filitti, 190 Ill. App. 3d 884, 546 N.E.2d 1142, 138 Ill. Dec. 87 (2d Dist. 1989). Defendant successfully established at a rescission hearing that a police officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe defendant had been driving while under the influence of alcohol. Defendant then filed a motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his arrest for the criminal charge. The trial court granted the motion solely on the basis that collateral estoppel prohibited the state from re-litigating the issue whether reasonable grounds existed to believe defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. The appellate court reversed finding that the trial court erred by applying collateral estoppel and granting the motion to suppress without allowing for a hearing on the motion to suppress.

People v. Thomas Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 561 N.E.2d 648, 149 Ill. Dec. 278 (1990). A trial court rescinded the summary suspension based upon a finding that no probable cause existed for the stop of defendant's vehicle. Defendant's motion to quash arrest and sup-press evidence was granted on the premise that the finding at the summary suspension collaterally estopped the state from contesting the motion to quash arrest. The appellate court affirmed.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed holding that the finding at a summary suspension hearing suppressing a breath test could not act as collateral estoppel regarding any litigation of the same issue for the DUI criminal proceeding. This was because the license suspension proceedings are to be swift and of limited scope. Therefore the court declined to give a preclusive effect to the license suspension hearings as it pertains to issues raised for a criminal proceeding.

People v. Williams, 206 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 565 N.E.2d 164, 151 Ill. Dec. 893 (1st Dist. 1990). A trial court rescinded a summary suspension on the grounds there was no probable cause to believe defendant was under actual physical control of an auto while under the influence of alcohol. The trial court on the grounds of collateral estoppel ruled the issue of probable cause could not be re-litigated at the criminal proceeding. The appellate court reversed relying upon People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162 (1990), which holds that the doctrine of collateral estoppel will not ban an issue from being re-litigated in a DUI criminal proceeding even if the issue was decided at a summary suspension hearing. See People v. Hackman, 209 Ill. App. 3d 779, 567 N.E.2d 1109, 153 Ill. Dec. 882 (1st Dist. 1991).

§ 2.10-3 Credit Against Fee Given Improperly

People v. Elizalde, 344 Ill. App. 3d 678, 800 N.E.2d 859, 279 Ill. Dec. 571 (2d Dist. 2003) Defendant had been convicted of DUI three times. When his probation was revoked defendant was assessed a $100 fee. The fee was for an assessment ordered by the trial court because defendant's conviction was a second or subsequent conviction of DUI. Defendant claimed on appeal that pursuant to section 110-14 of the Criminal Code of 1963, the trial court should given him a $5-per-day credit for time served against an assessment ordered by the trial court.

The appellate court affirmed. Sec. 11014 speaks to credits being allowed as it relates to fines and not fees. In analyzing sec. 110-14, the court concluded the legislature did not intend the...