§ 15.9 Mental Illness Negating Mens Rea

LibraryCriminal Law in Oregon (OSBar) (2022 Ed.)

§ 15.9 MENTAL ILLNESS NEGATING MENS REA

§ 15.9-1 ORS 161.300 and Negating Mens Rea

§ 15.9-1(a) Introduction

The state must, of course, prove every element of the charged crime. If a person's criminal liability for the charged crime requires a culpable mental element (mens rea), the state must prove it. See ORS 161.095.

ORS 161.300 allows a defendant to present evidence of the defendant's qualifying mental disorder to challenge the state's proof regarding the mens rea requirement. The statute provides as follows: "Evidence that the actor suffered from a qualifying mental disorder is admissible whenever it is relevant to the issue of whether the actor did or did not have the intent which is an element of the crime." ORS 161.300.

If there is a lesser included crime (e.g., manslaughter with the mens rea of reckless, as a lesser included charge of intentional murder), the defendant may wish to argue that the defendant is guilty of the lesser crime (rather than "guilty" or "guilty except for insanity" of the greater crime), because the defendant's mental illness reduced the mens rea. If there is no lesser included offense, the verdict that the defendant should seek is "not guilty." See generally State v. Francis, 284 Or 621, 623 n 2, 588 P2d 611 (1978) (note that one of the holdings in Francis—that ORS 161.300 only applies to intentional crimes—was abrogated by State v. Smith, 154 Or App 37, 50, 960 P2d 877 (1998), discussed in § 15.9-1(b)).

For example, under ORS 161.300, a defendant who is charged with burglary may assert that the defendant is guilty merely of criminal trespass, on the ground that the defendant broke into the building because internal psychotic voices told the defendant that the property in the building belonged to the defendant. In this scenario, the defendant knew that the defendant was not permitted in the building, and intentionally broke into it, but the defendant did not intend to steal the property of another.

Under ORS 161.300, a defendant may present evidence that a qualifying mental disorder prevented the defendant from forming the requisite intent for an element of the crime. The prosecution may then rebut the evidence. See State v. Stockett, 278 Or 637, 644, 565 P2d 739 (1977) (the defendant argued that his mens rea lowered intentional arson to reckless burning).

Under the terms of ORS 161.300, the defendant's "qualifying mental disorder is admissible," and this is true even if the defendant also has a personality disorder.

§ 15.9-1(b) ORS 161.300 Does Not Describe a "Defense," It Describes a Defense Strategy

The strategic approach set forth in ORS 161.300 is sometimes referred to as a "defense of partial responsibility," or a "defense of diminished capacity," but those phrases are inaccurate and misleading.

ORS 161.300 provides: "Evidence that the actor suffered from a qualifying mental disorder is admissible whenever it is relevant to the issue of whether the actor did or did not have the intent which is an element of the crime."

ORS 161.300 is a...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT