§ 13.04 California v. Carney: The Mobility and Lesser-Expectation-of-Privacy Rationales at Work

• Jurisdiction: United States

§ 13.04 California v. Carney: The Mobility and Lesser-Expectation-of-Privacy Rationales at Work

California v. Carney⁴⁴ involved a warrantless search of a "fully mobile 'motor home' located in a public place." The police received uncorroborated information that C was using his motor home as a site for exchanging drugs for sex. At the time, C was parked in a city lot, near a courthouse where a warrant could have been secured. The police put the motor home under surveillance for one and one-quarter hours, during which time they saw a youth enter the vehicle, and later leave with marijuana. The youth confirmed that he received the drugs in exchange for sexual contacts by C. Although there was no indication that the vehicle was about to depart, or even that C knew that he was under surveillance, the police entered the motor home without a warrant or consent, and seized drugs inside.

The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Warren Burger, discussed both rationales for the automobile exception. Regarding mobility, it stated that the motor home was "obviously readily mobile by the turn of a switch key." This statement is true, of course, in the sense that the motor home had the capacity for movement; however, if that capacity had been utilized while an officer was seeking a warrant, the vehicle would doubtlessly have been immediately stopped. The Chief Justice's sense of "mobility" approximated Justice White's understanding of the term in Chambers v. Maroney,⁴⁵ and was contrary to the plurality analysis in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.⁴⁶Except, perhaps, for a motor vehicle without wheels or a battery — which is not really a motorized vehicle — nearly any car is "mobile" in the sense explained here.

As for the lesser-expectation-of-privacy rationale, the Court stated that even when an automobile is not "immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use . . . justifie[s] application of the vehicular exception." Chief Justice Burger conceded that C's vehicle "possessed some, if not many of the attributes of a home." Nonetheless, "it is equally clear that the vehicle falls within the scope of the exception laid down [in the automobile] cases." And, critically perhaps, "the vehicle was so situated that an objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle."

Of course, C might have been using his vehicle as both a residence and a mode of transportation. Even if this were the case, the automobile exception...