§ 11.10 Due Process

• Jurisdiction: United States

§ 11.10 Due Process

Several courts have indicated that the improper use of other-acts evidence may violate due process.⁸⁵ In Estelle v. McGuire,⁸⁶ the Supreme Court considered such a claim. McGuire was convicted of murdering his infant daughter. At trial, two physicians testified that the infant was a battered child, a finding based on prior injuries, some of which were discovered during the autopsy. McGuire argued that evidence of these prior injuries violated the rule prohibiting prior-crimes evidence. The Court disagreed, first noting that federal habeas was limited to a review of federal issues, typically federal constitutional issues, and does not extend to violations of state evidentiary rules.⁸⁷Consequently, admission of the evidence had to be judged on due process grounds. The Court found the evidence relevant and therefore did not have to determine whether the admission of irrelevant evidence violates due process.⁸⁸

McGuire also challenged the instruction, arguing that it permitted the jury to use propensity evidence in violation of due process. The Court disagreed with this interpretation of the instruction, finding that it did not violate the propensity rule. Rather, it presented an issue similar to an instruction on other-acts evidence under Federal Rule 404(b)—i.e., evidence offered for some purpose other than character (propensity). The Court therefore had no reason to determine whether a propensity instruction would be unconstitutional.⁸⁹

While unlikely in a routine case, the admissibility of other-acts evidence may violate due process in a particularly egregious case.

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Notes:

^[85] See 2 Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence ch. 10 (2013) (constitutional restrictions).

^[86] 502 U.S. 62 (1991).

^[87] Id. at 72 ("Nor do our habeas powers allow us to reverse McGuire's conviction based on a belief that the trial judge incorrectly interpreted the California Evidence Code in ruling that the prior injury evidence was admissible as bad acts evidence in this case."). See also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) ("The Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules.").

^[88] 502 U.S. at 70 ("Concluding, as we do, that the prior injury evidence was relevant to an issue in the case, we need not explore further the apparent assumption of the Court of...