§ 11.09 DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

• Jurisdiction: United States

§ 11.09. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

At one time the federal courts were divided over whether a prior acquittal precluded the admission of other-acts evidence.⁷⁶ The Supreme Court had ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause encompassed the doctrine of collateral estoppel,⁷⁷ and some courts extended this principle to other-acts evidence.⁷⁸ The opposing view discerned a significant (and constitutional) difference between the evidentiary use of the other offense and standing trial a second time for that offense.⁷⁹

In Dowling v. United States,⁸⁰ the Supreme Court rejected the double jeopardy and due process arguments. According to the Court, the prior acquittal meant only that the prosecution had failed to establish the defendant's guilt of the other crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard of admissibility for other-acts evidence is far less demanding. In contrast, the prosecution in a federal trial need only introduce sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the accused committed the other act ("prima facie" standard).⁸¹ Thus, collateral estoppel did not apply. In addition, the Court found nothing fundamentally unfair about introducing such evidence.⁸²

If the evidence is admitted, the defendant may be entitled to introduce evidence of the acquittal⁸³ and to an acquittal instruction according to some state (but not federal) courts.⁸⁴

--------

Notes:

^[76] Compare United States v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1979) (evidence of another crime is not necessarily inadmissible by the fact of acquittal), with Albert v. Montgomery, 732 F.2d 865, 869-70 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 334-35 (2d Cir. 1980) (collateral estoppel precludes admission of evidence of other crimes following an acquittal).

^[77] See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (case did not involve other-acts evidence).

^[78] See State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 308-09 (Minn. 1979) ("It is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence that once the state has mustered its evidence against a defendant and failed, the matter is done. In the eyes of the law the acquitted defendant is to be treated as innocent and in the interests of fairness and finality made no more to answer for his alleged crime. It is our view that the admission into a trial of evidence of crimes of which the defendant has been acquitted prejudices and burdens the defendant in contravention of this basic principle and is fundamentally unfair.").

^[79] See ...