§ 1.06 Interpreting the Federal Rules: The "Plain Meaning" Doctrine

• Jurisdiction: North Carolina

§ 1.06 Interpreting the Federal Rules: The "Plain Meaning" Doctrine

Federal Rule 102, the "purpose" provision, reads: "These rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination." The goals set out in this rule often serve cross-purposes. Consequently, the rule is not particularly helpful in addressing particular evidentiary issues.

The principal problem here concerns the relationship between the Rules and the common law. This relationship raises two distinct issues. The first concerns "gaps" in the Rules, i.e., evidence issues not addressed by any rule. The second issue relates to the use of the common law in interpreting specific rules.

The "gap" problem. The Federal Rules were not intended to be a complete codification of all evidentiary rules. Professor Cleary, the Reporter for the Rules, wrote that Rule 102 indicates "one thing of importance: the answers to all questions that may arise under the Rules may not be found in specific terms in the Rules."⁷¹ For example, no provision in the Rules governs the use of bias as a method of impeachment. Nevertheless, when the issue came before the Supreme Court in United States v. Abel,⁷² the Court held that impeachment of a witness for bias was proper. According to the Court, "the lesson to be drawn is that it is permissible to impeach a witness by showing his bias under the Federal Rules of Evidence just as it was permissible to do so before their adoption."⁷³

Common law. As noted above, the second issue concerns interpreting specific rules. There are numerous examples of the need to resort to the common law when interpreting the Rules of Evidence. For example, Rule 301 governs presumptions but does not define that term; the common law must be consulted.⁷⁴ Rule 406 governs habit evidence but does not define what habit is; again the common law must be consulted.⁷⁵ Rule 613 governs impeachment by prior inconsistent statements but provides no elaboration of the "inconsistency" requirement; there is a substantial body of evidence case law on this point.⁷⁶ As Judge Becker and Professor Orenstein commented: "Unquestionably, the Federal Rules coexist with unstated common law assumptions that were never formally incorporated into the corpus of the Rules. The special relationship of the Federal Rules to the common law and the special expertise of...