Vol. 168 No. 7, June 2020

Index

• FRAMING THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS.
• NASCENT COMPETITORS.
• ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, REGULATION, AND DIGITAL PLATFORMS.
• THE DICHOTOMOUS TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES IN HORIZONTAL MERGERS: TOO MUCH? TOO LITTLE? GETTING IT RIGHT?
• OLIGOPOLY COORDINATION, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, AND THE PROPHYLACTIC ROLE OF HORIZONTAL MERGER ENFORCEMENT.
• THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN PREVENTING PATENT HOLDUP.
• COMPETITION LAW AS COMMON LAW: AMERICAN EXPRESS AND THE EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST.
• PROBABILITY, PRESUMPTIONS AND EVIDENTIARY BURDENS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: REVITALIZING THE RULE OF REASON FOR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT.
• THE POST-CHICAGO ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: A RETROSPECTIVE.