Journal of Accounting Research

Publisher:
Wiley
Publication date:
2021-02-01
ISBN:
0021-8456

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  • Ethnic Minority Analysts’ Participation in Public Earnings Conference Calls

    We investigate ethnic minority and nonminority sell‐side analysts’ participation in public earnings conference calls. We find that minority analysts are underrepresented in conference call Q&A sessions, and minority analysts who do participate on the calls experience lower levels of prioritization than do nonminority analysts. Minority analysts’ lower participation rates are partially but not fully mediated by characteristics such as experience, work environment, and stock rating favorability. Additionally, firm and conference call fixed effects mediate approximately half the magnitude of lower minority participation rates. Extroverted minority analysts participate at higher rates, but the negative association between minority status and conference call participation is exacerbated when calls are more time constrained, when executive teams are less diverse, and when analysts are from less prestigious brokerage houses. Overall, we document the underrepresentation of minority analysts on earnings conference calls and provide evidence suggesting both analysts’ and managers’ choices influence minority analysts’ participation rates.

  • The Effect of Client Industry Agglomerations on Auditor Industry Specialization

    Prior research on auditor industry specialization documents fee premiums for local audit offices that are industry specialists. This research assumes that the effects of specialization are uniform across markets. We examine industry specialization based on the economic theory of industry agglomeration (geographic areas with high industry concentration). Agglomeration economies can facilitate access to knowledge for auditors serving a specific industry in those locations. We find that industry specialists in agglomerations earn a fee premium in excess of specialists in other markets. We find that nonspecialist offices in agglomerations also earn fee premiums in that industry when compared to nonspecialists in other markets even when controlling for these groups’ absolute share of the national market. We also address whether or not this expertise can be shared among offices in an agglomeration specialist's firm. We find that audit offices that have easy connections to a within‐firm office in an agglomerated market can earn a fee premium relative to more distant offices, suggesting a benefit from knowledge transfer. This fee premium accrues to offices that would not be considered a specialist using traditional market share measures in a given industry. These findings indicate that the benefit of industry specialization depends on more than local market share.

  • Out of Site, Out of Mind? The Role of the Government‐Appointed Corporate Monitor

    We study the role of a relatively new type of external firm monitor, an on‐site government‐appointed Corporate Monitor, and assess whether such appointments reduce firms' propensity to violate laws. Using a sample of deferred and nonprosecution agreements, we first document the determinants of Monitor appointment. We find firms that voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and have more independent directors are less likely to have Corporate Monitors, whereas those with more severe infractions, mandated board changes, and increased cooperation requirements are more likely to have Monitors. We find such appointments are associated with an 18%–25% reduction in violations while the Monitor is on site, however, the effect does not persist after the Monitorship ends. Using a semisupervised machine learning method to measure changes in firms' ethics and compliance norms, we find that the reduction in violations is associated with changes in ethics and compliance that also do not persist. Finally, we document that firms under Monitorship experience a persistent reduction in innovation, highlighting a previously unexplored cost of these interventions. Overall, our results suggest that, although Corporate Monitors on site are associated with fewer violations, firms revert to previous levels of violations following Monitors' departure.

  • Do Governments Hide Resources from Unions? The Influence of Public Sector Unions on Reported Discretionary Fund Balance Ratios

    We explore whether municipalities with public sector unions exploit aspects of governmental (or “fund”) accounting to obscure the availability of discretionary resources in fund balance accounts, relative to municipalities without public sector unions. We first investigate whether governments with unions report higher proportions of discretionary resources outside of the general fund, a primary measure of financial health, and instead within less prominent fund types. Second, we explore whether governments with unions report lower ratios within accessible general fund balance account categories – that is, report lower proportions of unreserved fund balance. Primary findings are consistent with both hypotheses. Although somewhat mixed, cross‐sectional analyses reveal that effects are magnified when unions have more bargaining power, as proxied by the ability to strike or the absence of state right‐to‐work laws. Further analysis corroborates cross‐sectional findings by examining difference‐in‐differences specifications surrounding the quasi‐exogenous shock of Wisconsin's 2011 weakening of state public sector union laws and Ohio's time‐varying union contract negotiations. Overall, the evidence suggests that governments with unions shelter resources to avoid the appearance of large discretionary amounts available.

  • The Real Effects of Modern Information Technologies: Evidence from the EDGAR Implementation

    Using the implementation of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system from 1993 to 1996 as a shock to information dissemination technologies, we examine how a significant reduction in disclosure processing costs affects the real economy. We find that the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in corporate investment and that this effect is concentrated in value firms. We provide evidence that improved equity financing and enhanced managerial incentives are likely the underlying mechanisms. Specifically, the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in a firm's stock liquidity, a decrease in the cost of equity capital, and an increase in the level of equity financing. Consistent with the monitoring effect of broad information dissemination, the EDGAR implementation leads to an increase in a firm's operating performance. Our findings suggest that it is important to consider information dissemination beyond information production when examining the real effects of corporate disclosures.

  • Did the FASB Codification Reduce the Complexity of Applying U.S. GAAP?

    We examine whether the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Codification made it easier for preparers and auditors to locate relevant accounting guidance. We find that areas of U.S. GAAP with more dispersed and voluminous guidance before the Codification experience a larger post‐Codification reduction in restatements. We find a similar decline in SEC comment letter questions referencing areas of U.S. GAAP with more dispersed and voluminous pre‐Codification guidance. Our results suggest that before the Codification, preparers and auditors had difficulty in locating the appropriate accounting guidance and that the Codification mitigated this difficulty.

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