The Supreme Court goes to the dogs: reconciling Florida v. Harris and Florida v. Jardines.

AuthorOwsley, Brian L.
PositionUse of drug-detection dogs

In the most recent Term, the United States Supreme Court has issued rulings affecting criminal investigations and Fourth Amendment rights in two cases involving the use of drug-detection dogs: Florida u. Harris (1) and Florida v. Jardines. (2) These otherwise unrelated appeals from the Florida Supreme Court both address overlapping issues concerning the use of such dogs by police officers. (3) Although the United States Supreme Court has previously addressed a criminal defendant's rights in cases involving drug-detection dogs, (4) these two decisions will significantly influence such jurisprudence going forward.

It has long been accepted "that dogs have the ability to detect the smallest traces of odors and to perceive these scents much better than human beings." (5) Indeed, dogs have been used for their ability to detect scents for over two hundred years. (6) This article provides a brief description of the development of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding sniff tests by drug-detection dogs in Part I. Specifically, it discusses United States v. Place, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, (7) and Illinois v. Caballes, which were the three leading Supreme Court decisions on these issues prior to the most recently concluded Term. (8) Taken as a whole, these three decisions establish that just a sniff by a drug detection dog does not violate the Fourth Amendment. In Part II, the factual and procedural background of Harris as well as its legal analysis is discussed. Next, Part III provides a similar background and analysis for Jardines. Part IV analyzes the differences between Jardines and Harris. This discussion reconciles their differences by finding not only consistency with existing Supreme Court jurisprudence, but also wisdom in both decisions. In Part V, the importance of the reconciliation and the applicability of Harris and Jardines are discussed in the context of cases faced in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. In particular, this section focuses on a month of drug smuggling cases and examines how drug dogs are imperative to the interdiction.

  1. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT A SNIFF BY A DRUG-DETECTION DOG IS NOT A FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION

    1. United States v. Place

      In Place, the United States Supreme Court addressed "whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily detaining personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics." (9) Raymond Place purchased an airplane ticket to fly from Miami International Airport to LaGuardia Airport in New York City. (10) While he was waiting in line, his behavior made agents suspicious, prompting them to approach him. (11) As Place walked toward his gate, they interacted with him, requesting to see his ticket and identification. (12) Ultimately, however, these agents were unable to search his luggage because his airplane was about to depart. (13) Nonetheless, they noted that there were discrepancies in the addresses listed on his two checked suitcases along with discrepancies in other information that he had provided. (14)

      Based on these various suspicions, the Drug Enforcement Agency in New York was contacted and agents met Place's flight at LaGuardia Airport where they too became suspicious of him. (15) Before he left the airport, these agents approached Place indicating they believed he was trafficking in narcotics. (16) He informed them that police officers had searched his luggage at the airport in Miami, and the agents responded by telling him they knew this was untrue. (17) After Place declined to authorize a search of his luggage, "one of the agents told him that they were going to take the luggage to a federal judge to try to obtain a search warrant and that" he could come with them, but he again declined. (18)

      Instead of obtaining a search warrant, the agents took the luggage to Kennedy Airport, where a drug-detection dog performed a free air sniff of the suitcases and alerted to the smaller suitcase. (19) Although the trip to Kennedy Airport and the sniff test took only ninety minutes, "[b]ecause it was late on a Friday afternoon, the agents [ultimately held] the luggage until Monday morning, when they [obtained] a search warrant ... for the smaller bag." (20) After executing the warrant, over a kilogram of cocaine was found. (21) Place was charged and subsequently "indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute." (22)

      Place filed a motion to suppress arguing that the seizure of his luggage violated his Fourth Amendment rights; however, the district court denied the motion because the "detention of the bags could be justified if based on reasonable suspicion to believe that the bags contained narcotics." (23) On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed due in large part to the lengthy time that Place's luggage had been seized by the agents. (24) The government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. (25)

      The Supreme Court in Place explained at the outset that as a general rule the Fourth Amendment applies to search and seizure of personal effects, like luggage. (26) However, where law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe that luggage contains contraband, such as narcotics, then they may seize it. (27) Next, the Court addressed whether Terry v. Ohio applied. (28) In Terry, the Supreme Court held that police officers are permitted to briefly stop suspects and frisk them for weapons where "specific and articulable facts" exist to believe that they were involved in criminal activity. (29) In Place, the Court determined that the application of Terry principles as an exception to the probable cause standard was determined to be appropriate "to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope." (30)

      After establishing reasonable suspicion for the officers to search Place's luggage, the Court analyzed whether subjecting Place's luggage to the sniff test was a search. (31) In so doing, it emphasized that this investigative technique does not require opening the suitcase or rummaging through an individual's personal items in public view, which in turn limits any embarrassment or inconvenience to the luggage owner. (32) "Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item." (33) The Court characterized a canine sniff as sui generis because "no other investigative procedure ... is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure." (34) Consequently, the Court determined that the sniff test did not constitute a search. (35)

      Although the sniff test was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Court went on to explain that the holding of Place's luggage did constitute a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (36) Ultimately, the Court concluded that holding his luggage for ninety minutes made the seizure unreasonable. (37)

    2. City of Indianapolis u. Edmond

      About seventeen years later, in Edmond, the Court "consider[ed] the constitutionality of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose [was] the discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics." (38)

      In August 1998, the Indianapolis Police Department started conducting vehicle checkpoints on its streets in an attempt to prevent the flow of narcotics in the city. (39) Between August and November of that year, it set up six checkpoints throughout the city that resulted in the stopping of 1161 vehicles leading to 104 arrests, including fifty-five arrests for drug-related offenses. (40)

      Each checkpoint was operated with about thirty police officers, who stopped a pre-determined number of vehicles. (41) Based on a departmental directive regarding the operation, at least one officer was required to approach the vehicles to tell the drivers that they had been stopped at a drug checkpoint where they were required to provide the officer with their driver's license and vehicle registration. (42) During each stop, an officer checked to determine whether the driver demonstrated any signs of impairment, while a drug-detection dog circled the detained vehicle. (43)

      The departmental directive mandated that officers could search vehicles only if they had received consent, or if they developed "the appropriate quantum of particularized suspicion." (44) Moreover, each officer was required to "conduct each stop in the same manner until particularized suspicion develop[ed], and the officers ha[d] no discretion to stop any vehicle out of sequence." (45) Unless there was a basis to search a vehicle, each stop was to last no more than five minutes. (46)

      In September 1998, James Edmond and Joell Palmer were both stopped at one of the checkpoints. (47) Objecting to their stops, they subsequently filed a class action asserting that the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment. (48) Edmond and Palmer then filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, in which for the purpose of that motion they stipulated that the traffic stops adhered to the procedures outlined in the departmental directive, even though as a factual matter they maintained that such procedures were not followed in their stops. (49) The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted the request for class certification, but denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. (50) The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court, finding that the checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment. (51)

      When the case arrived before the Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, began her analysis by noting that any search or seizure must be reasonable and is unreasonable without...

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