Summary
Criminal responsibility in cases of somnabulism or hypnotic suggestion - Symposium: Act & Crime
The 1919 film 'The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari' provides an interesting test case for the theory of action and criminal responsibility, one that shows the limited applicability of the philosophy of action to criminal law. The film concerns a somnambulist, Cesare, who kills under the direction of Dr. Caligari. Cesare is the one who acts, even though Caligari is responsible for the murders. However, Michael S. Moore in 'Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and Its Implications for Criminal Law' suggests that the action is performed by Caligari. In this case, Moore is unnecessarily distorting the philosophy of action to conform to the requirements of criminal law.See the full content of this document
Extract
The actus reus of Dr. Caligari.
Michael Moore's book is subtitled "the philosophy of action and its implications for criminal law."(1) For much of his discussion, this formulation does express the way in which he proceeds: an account of action that is philosophically (as he often puts it, "metaphysically") motivated yields the kinds of distinctions and conclusions that are needed in order to support central principles of the criminal law, particularly as these have been formulated in the tradition reaching back to Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. In particular, three fundamental principles of the criminal law are defended, on the basis of philosophical considerations, from philosophical skepticism. These are the principles that Moore calls the voluntary act requirement, the actus reus requirement, and the double jeopardy requirement.(2) Moore's many subtle and interesting discussions succeed in showing that these principles can be defended against skepticism by philosophical argument.
However, there are areas in relation to which the subtitle seems to me to represent, as one might say, an exaggeration. In these areas, the best that one can do is to take some distinction or conclusion necessary to the criminal law and show that a theoretical account of it can be given that is at least not inconsistent with formulations motivated by the philosophy of action. It seems obvious, on reflection, that there must be areas about which this is true. The criminal law, after all, has special aims and purposes, and the requirements that it imposes on describing people's actions are u...See the full content of this document
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