Our bandit future? Cities, shantytowns, and climate change governance.

• Author: Crawford, Colin

Introduction I. Cities, Shantytowns, and Extra-Legal Settlements A. The Neglect of Cities B. Defining Interests Within Cities II. Consequences of not Hearing from Cities in Climate Change Debate III. Refocusing the Climate Change Debate and Norm Articulation by City Voices A. Who Is Heard in Climate Change Discussions B. Towards New Governance Norms: Some Benefits of Listening to Cities and Shantytowns 1. Adding Unheard Voices 2. Proposals for Infrastructure and Land Reforms: Local Thinking to Aid Global Action 3. Focus on Environmental Justice in Climate Change Governance IV. The Search for a Solution A. The Example of Participatory Budgeting B. Promoting Citizen Participation in Distributive Justice Decisions C. Effectiveness of Decisions D. Participatory Democracy and the Accountability of Elected Representatives INTRODUCTION

The effects of climate change on the world's cities and the people who live in them are not subjects that have received a great deal of attention, at least not in isolation from other climate change effects. Climate change effects tend to get considered in continental or regional terms: melting ice caps, agricultural crop losses across vast swaths of land, and shoreline loss that will inundate sub-continents. (1) Alternately, the discussion tends to focus on behavioral change, again at the level of entire national populations, suggesting that countries must consider using cleaner energy sources, producing cleaner-burning vehicles, and providing incentives for citizens to insulate their homes better. (2) Many, if not most, commentators seem to endorse the view that resolution of climate change challenges should be addressed at the global level and enforced by state parties pursuant to global accords. (3) More recently, there has been some discussion of the inequalities that climate change will exacerbate. Crudely put, the analysis posits that poorer nations, especially those in Asia and Africa, will become poorer, while the richer nations will--if they do not become richer--suffer fewer of the negative consequences of climate change. (4) In light of these differential climate change effects on poorer nations, some analysts have explored the probability of increased civil strife. However, even when the literature examines effects of climate change on civil strife, the analysis tends to address national roles and bilateral or multilateral national responses. (5) Furthermore, when land use changes are discussed, urban land use is typically excluded from consideration. The focus tends to be on deforestation and agricultural land. (6)

This debate strikingly neglects what is arguably the dominant demographic shift of our era, namely the global trend towards urbanization--the move to mega-cities. As the United Nations Population Fund reports, in 2008, a majority of the world's population will live in urban areas. That number is expected to increase by another 50% by 2030. (7) In historical terms, it is impossible to understate the significance of this phenomenon, especially inasmuch as the vast majority of these urban immigrants will arrive with few resources and live in slum conditions. (8) Moreover, perhaps the characteristic feature of many such slums is that they are dominated by the informal economy, characterized by oppressive systems of patronage, corruption, and violence. (9) As the world gets hotter, this seems likely to create a--perhaps literally--combustible situation. (10) A host of factors, including environmental degradation, inadequate provision of environmental and infrastructure services, and limited employment opportunities are combining to turn many of the world's mega-slums into dangerous, violent places. (11) Moreover, there is considerable literature that has examined the relationship between increased urban violence and temperature rise. (12) It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, to posit a connection between climate change and urban violence, one that calls for attention to the role of cities in resolving the adverse effects of climate change. This Article does not (because it cannot) presume to establish as an empirical matter that climate change is a cause of urban violence. Rather, the connection between urban violence and climate change provides the point of departure for this Article. That is, in light of the empirical work establishing a connection between urban violence and both environmental scarcity and temperature rise, this Article proceeds on the assumption that as an environmental pressure (perhaps the greatest environmental pressure), climate change can only exacerbate these phenomena.

In light of this connection and its serious social and economic consequences, this Article seeks, therefore, to begin to define a role for cities and their inhabitants in climate change governance. Part I argues that if we fail to take into account global urbanization and its defining characteristics, namely extreme squalor and associated social ills, as a central feature of climate change policy, we face, as a Rio de Janeiro taxi driver said to me during the hot, dry, violent winter of 2006 in that city, (13) "um futuro bandido," literally "a bandit future." That is, we face a future where cities, the places where most of the world's population lives, will experience sustained and perhaps intractable urban violence and social disintegration, a development that can only hasten the separate but related harms caused by climate change on the world's human and biological populations. Part I also explains that the term "cities" does not refer only--or even primarily--to elected or appointed municipal governments. Rather, Part I endorses an expansive understanding of cities to include both metropolitan areas on the official grid and also the shantytowns and slums, the expansive informal and extra-legal settlements that define urban living for millions the world over.

Part II explores some of the consequences of the inattention of the climate change literature, and especially the mainstream U.S.-based legal scholarship on climate change, to incorporate a voice for the world's mega-cities and their extensive mega-slums in climate change governance. In particular, Part II argues that the failure to incorporate a voice for cities reinforces existing and seemingly intractable divisions in international efforts to resolve climate change. Thus, elites with carbon-consumptive behaviors in "developing" countries can hide behind their nations' demands for reductions in "developed" countries, while, conversely, responsible actors in "developed" countries get grouped together with the carbon-consumptive habits of their economic betters. Part II therefore suggests that the presence of voices representing urban populations would help reveal some of the self-interest on all sides and redirect climate change law and policy towards the implementation of more equitable solutions.

Part III then outlines some of the normative advantages of city-inclusive governance in the context of climate change regulation. Part III thus suggests how incorporating voices from cities in climate change governance will serve the larger goals of climate change regulation, including emissions reductions strategies and particularly the goal of adaptive management.

Finally, Part IV outlines possible solutions to address the concerns addressed in the previous parts, suggesting ways in which climate change debate and the search for legal solutions to help combat the phenomenon might take account of global urbanization. Specifically, Part IV suggests ways in which a voice for cities, and in particular those urban residents usually without voices--in local or national, much less international forums--may be heard, and their views taken into account in reversing the negative effects of climate change.

1. CITIES, SHANTYTOWNS, AND EXTRA-LEGAL SETTLEMENTS

   This Part seeks to establish the value of cities, or portions of them, as actors in the resolution of global climate change problems. First and most evidently, cities merit such a role because of their established strengths as centers of innovation and wealth. (14) Cities are also, however, centers of inequality: it is this feature of modern cities that may be as important to addressing climate change as their more positive aspects, given that in reality poor urban areas are anticipated disproportionately to suffer the effects of global warming and associated ills. (15) It may also be observed that city residents are especially concerned with climate change, in light of the dizzying profusion of local initiatives to address climate change. (16) Yet, oddly, in the United States, the federal government appears to object to this phenomenon; attempts are underway to silence local efforts to respond to climate change, even in the face of federal inaction. (17)

   1. The Neglect of Cities

      The neglect of cities in international climate change debates and, in particular, in U.S. legal scholarship addressing climate change is not entirely surprising. As Gerald Frug noted in a classic piece nearly three decades ago, cities have largely been rendered powerless in U.S. legal discourse and practice. Frug noted the paradox that our "highly urbanized country has chosen to have powerless cities, and that this choice has largely been made through legal doctrine." (18) Frug further noted another paradoxical development: "[n]ot only are cities unable to exercise general governmental power, but they also cannot exercise the economic power of private corporations." (19)

      In the context of global climate change debates, Frug's observation is instructive: in climate change, corporate interests are among those recognized as having a stake in resolving the problem, while cities are not. The corporate interest is often included because it is modified by the adjective "multinational," as if the mere fact of doing cross-boundary business merits inclusion with governmental stakeholders. At...