Non-International Armed Conflicts in the Philippines

• Author: Raymundo B. Ferrer - Randolph G. Cabangbang
• Position: Armed Forces of the Philippines - Philippine Army
• Pages: 263-278

XII

Non-International Armed Conflicts in the

Philippines

Raymundo B. Ferrer and Randolph G. Cabangbang*

ManyU.S. soldiers serving in Joint Special Task Force-Philippines, with

extensive experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and other theaters of war, have

repeatedly described the non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) in Mindanao

as particularly complex. In an area where there is astrong gun culture, where local

residents are part-time insurgents and where kinship ties serve as force multipliers,

how indeed do we distinguish civilians from armed insurgents?

This article discusses NIACs in the Philippines and briefly notes the challenges

they pose to the security sector in applying the rules of international humanitarian

law (IHL). To provide abasic framework in understanding the nature of conflict in

the Philippines, we begin with an organizational-level analysis of the NIACs. How-

ever, it must be noted that on the ground, from the individual and operational lev-

els of analysis, it is not so neatly delineated. For example, organizational identities

in southern Mindanao, unlike in the West, are highly temporal and fluid. Civilians

can be recruited to work seasonally for an insurgent group and then quickly and

seamlessly resume their civilian lives after operations are completed. Added to this

complexity are the changing organizational labels civilians effortlessly assume

without much question. Some civilians may work for one insurgent group that has

*General Raymundo B. Ferrer, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Lieutenant Colonel

Randolph G. Cabangbang (INF), Philippine Army.

Non-International Armed Conflicts in the Philippines

an outstanding peace agreement with the government and then on the same day

join acommand structure of aknown terrorist group. Then they very quickly

switch to supporting relatives and kin who belong to agroup currently in peace

negotiations with the government.

Organizations in the Philippines revolve around personalities rather than posi-

tions. 1While the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines (AFP) strives for interoperability

among its branches and with its allies, in Mindanao is an enemy for whom

interoperability seems like second nature. The NIACs in the Philippines are largely

ahomegrown phenomenon with some components heavily influenced by foreign

elements. Conflicts rooted in ideologies outside the Philippines have been co-

opted to provide aphilosophical justification to agrassroots-driven insurgency.

This article will primarily focus on two major NIACs facing the Philippines. For

convenience, they will be referred to as the two "Ms": the Maoist group and the

Moro group. Their origins will be traced and adescription provided of their basic

strategies and structures.

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New

People's Army (NPA), use Maoist ideology to justify the armed struggle against the

government. The CPP is considered the biggest threat to the security of the Phil-

ippines. 2Its scope is nationwide. While strongest in the northern region of the

Philippines, the Maoist group also has apresence in northern and eastern

Mindanao. It tends to target farmers in the rural areas, workers in the mining in-

dustry, teachers, youth, women's groups and many other segments of the work-

ing-class population that are vulnerable to the persuasion of the Maoist ideology

for recruitment. The Moro group, on the other hand, limits itself to the southern

Philippines. Like the CPP-NPA, it is also homegrown—asecessionist movement

that has been fighting for independence for more than ahundred years. Islamic

ideology inspires its members to fight for self-determination and recognition of

their ethnic identity.

The Maoist and Moro groups both exploit conditions of poverty and

marginalization in marshalling their armed struggle against the government. Ac-

cording to the Asian Development Bank, in 2008 about twenty-six million Filipi-

nos out of atotal population of ninety-two million lived below the Asian poverty

line. 3In other words, they lived on about US$ 1.35 per day. The poorest of the poor

live in Muslim Mindanao. The Muslim poor are particularly marginalized from

mainstream Filipino society and this fuels much of their grievance against the

Philippine government. While the Maoist group targets people through their oc-

cupation, the Moro group appeals to ethnicity and shared history in its recruit-

ment efforts.

264