Lessening the rehabilitative focus of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act: a trend towards punitive juvenile dispositions?

• Author: Lewis, Meghan E.

1. INTRODUCTION

   Both the federal and state governments have recognized that criminal adults and delinquent juveniles are fundamentally different. Acknowledging that juveniles are more amenable to successful rehabilitation than adults, each government has created a separate juvenile justice system to better handle these unique concerns. The federal structure for juvenile adjudication was established by the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act ("FJDA," "the Act"), (2) and was enacted to provide individualized rehabilitation for juvenile delinquents in an informal, less procedurally rigid setting than traditional criminal courts. (3) The FJDA grants federal district courts considerable discretion in determining whether a juvenile should be adjudicated under the FJDA or prosecuted as an adult, as well as in balancing the broadly categorized factors enumerated in the Act.

   Despite the FJDA's recognition that juveniles are more suitable to rehabilitation than adults, courts seem to be moving away from a rehabilitative approach of juvenile delinquency dispositions. In United States v. M.R.M., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed a punitive disposition of a teenage girl that resulted in a sentence of nearly three years of incarceration. (4) This ruling is an example, therefore, of courts ignoring the rehabilitative purpose of the FJDA. This Note argues that the decision in United States v. M.R.M. marks a change toward delivering punitive juvenile justice in the Eighth Circuit, and that the informal structure of the FJDA, combined with significant judicial discretion, vague factors of consideration outlined in the statute, and a lack of sentencing guidelines has the potential to create disparate dispositions among similarly situated juveniles.

2. FACTS AND HOLDING

   In 2004, an unknown man assaulted then sixteen year-old M.R.M. while she was with three other female acquaintances. (5) During the attack, the acquaintances left M.R.M. alone and did not assist her. (6) A few days after the attack, while at a house on an Indian reservation in South Dakota, M.R.M.

   realized that one of the acquaintances was going to be visiting that same house. (7) With a baseball bat in hand, M.R.M. met the girl at the door and proceeded to strike her numerous times, severely injuring the girl. (8) M.R.M. was charged under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act with a two-count information charge, one for assault with a dangerous weapon and the other for assault resulting in serious bodily injury. (9) Rejecting the government's recommendation that M.R.M. be put on probation for three years, the district court ordered M.R.M. to be committed in official detention (10) until she reached the age of twenty-one. (11) As a result of this order, M.R.M. spent a total of thirty-four months and twenty days in detention. (12) M.R.M. appealed for review of the sentence and based her appeal on the district court's rejection of the government's recommended sentence of probation and the court's much harsher sentence of nearly three years imprisonment. (13)

   On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, M.R.M. argued that the district court erred in the determination of her punishment. (14) M.R.M. contended that the court was plainly unreasonable in making its decision and that the decision was contrary to existing law. (15) She also argued that the court's consideration of her prior arrests as character evidence was unfairly prejudicial. (16) M.R.M.'s arguments attacked the court's broad discretion of sentencing juveniles and the disparities resulting from such discretion. (17) The court, however, did not find M.R.M.'s grounds for appeal persuasive and ultimately affirmed the district court's sentencing determination, finding that her sentence was not plainly unreasonable nor contrary to law, and that the district court did not plainly err when it considered her prior arrest record when determining her sentence. (18)

3. LEGAL BACKGROUND

   The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (19) cannot be fully understood without first noting its legislative history and the purposes behind its enactment. The FJDA was enacted in 1938 in response to the idea of separating adult and juvenile criminal adjudications. (20) One motive for providing separate proceedings was the belief that juveniles were more responsive to rehabilitative treatment than they were to traditional forms of criminal punishment. (21) The FJDA was established to create a procedural device for juvenile adjudication outside of the adult criminal context. (22) The Act itself does not create a federal offense, but instead provides the framework for the disposition of juveniles in the federal courts. (23) Further, a proceeding under the FJDA that results in a finding of delinquency does not result in a criminal conviction but rather an adjudication of status. (24) The courts' recognition of a presumption in favor of juvenile adjudication, rather than traditional adult criminal proceedings, emphasizes the FJDA's rehabilitative purpose, (25) and removes the stigma associated with being convicted of a criminal offense.

   1. Jurisdictional Requirements

      For the FJDA to apply, certain statutory requirements must be met. The first requirement is that the individual qualify as a "juvenile" under the FJDA's definition. The FJDA defines "juvenile" as "a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings and disposition ..., a person who has not attained his twenty-first birthday." (26) Importantly, the age of the individual is not an element of juvenile delinquency but merely a fact that triggers FJDA provisions and procedures. (27) Courts have also noted that a juvenile's age is relevant at the time the government commences proceedings, holding that when an offense was committed while the juvenile was under eighteen but his/her twenty-first birthday has passed before the proceeding is initiated, the FJDA no longer applies. (28) Courts reason that juvenile proceedings under the FJDA grant special treatment and protection to juveniles during adjudication, and that persons who are over twenty-one at the time of adjudication have "simply outgrown [the] status as a juvenile and the purposes and benefits of the Act." (29)

      Once it is determined that the individual qualifies as a juvenile within the meaning of the FJDA, federal jurisdiction under the Act is proper if "(1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction ..., (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony" or a Controlled Substance offense, (30) and a "substantial Federal interest" exists. (31) Additionally, courts have held that federal courts have proper jurisdiction for the adjudication of Native American juveniles for acts taking place on reservations, with procedures determined by the FJDA. (32) However, being treated as a juvenile under the FJDA is not an absolute right that prevents a juvenile from being criminally prosecuted as an adult. (33) The Attorney General must investigate and certify that the statutory requisites are met and present the certification to the district court. (34)

      Even if the statutory requirements are satisfied, the Attorney General can request a transfer of the juvenile to federal court for adult prosecution if the decision is necessary and in the interest of justice. (35) Prior to the FJDA's 1974 amendments, the Attorney General alone held the power to waive juvenile jurisdiction and have the juvenile tried as an adult. (36) Due to heavy criticism of the Attorney General's unfettered discretion in this arena, the FJDA's 1974 amendments limited this power. (37) Now, a presumption in favor of juvenile adjudication exists, requiring the Attorney General to file a motion for transfer, and overcome the presumption by proving that a prosecution as an adult is necessary. (38) The district court makes the ultimate decision as to the necessity of trying the individual as an adult and whether juvenile jurisdiction should be waived. (39)

      In determining whether a transfer of the juvenile is in the interest of justice, and thus necessary, the court has to balance six factors outlined in the Act. (40) These factors take account of a variety of traits, characteristics and background information about the juvenile at issue. (41) The factors Congress provided in the FJDA include:

      the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems. (42) Importantly, of these six factors, no single factor is determinative in deciding whether a juvenile proceeding should be transferred to an adult criminal tribunal. Further, the court is not required to give the same weight to each factor and only needs to weigh each factor as it sees fit. (43) The district court need only include its findings regarding these factors in the record, and then balance them "in the interest of justice" to determine the probability of successful rehabilitation before the juvenile reaches the age of majority. (44) Thus, the district court, through its considerable discretion, has a significant amount of control over whether a juvenile will receive a more lenient juvenile proceeding and disposition focusing on rehabilitation or an adult criminal proceeding focusing on punishment.

      One factor that has caused significant conflict among the federal courts is consideration of "the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record." The Act defines juvenile delinquency as "the violation of a law of the United States committed by a...