Legislating Military Doctrine: Congressional Usurping of Executive Authority Through Detainee Interrogations
Military Law Review › Nbr. 193, November 2007
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Military Law Review › Nbr. 193, November 2007
Linked as:Extract
Legislating Military Doctrine: Congressional Usurping of Executive Authority Through Detainee Interrogations
2007] LEGISLATING MILITARY DOCTRINE 97
LEGISLATING MILITARY DOCTRINE: CONGRESSIONAL USURPING OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY THROUGHDETAINEE INTERROGATIONSMAJOR JAMES A. BARKEI*I. IntroductionCongress must restrain itself from legislating military doctrine and permit the Executive to exercise its authority in control of military operations, including detainee interrogations. Recent passage of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) signifies Congress's foray into the realm of legislating military doctrine and operations.1 Congress's overreaching arm endangers the nation's military by restricting doctrinal development in the face of an ever-changing enemy. The President of the United States, as the head of the Executive branch of government that includes the Department of Defense (DOD) and its military forces, bears the responsibility for directing the manner in which military operations implement doctrine, including detainee interrogations.2 The current U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, states in its preface that the tactics, techniques, and procedures within the FM exist in accordance with the DTA.3 Throughthis Act, Congress effectively stifled the creativity and adaptability of the military, in essence freezing interrogation techniques.4The nation's military requires the ability to employ adaptable processes to overcome the challenges of the chaotic and unpredictable battlefield in the twenty-first century.5 While the U.S. Armed Forces stand glued to their now-limited interrogation doctrine, a rapidly changing enemy modifies its behavior to thwart known tactics, techniques, and procedures that bind the operations of the military.6 The DTA further compounds the disadvantage faced by the U.S. Armed Forces because many of its foes do not comply with international legal obligations under the law of armed conflict.7 Enemies that fail to obey the rules of war, coupled with legislative restrictions on military operations, could lead to failure in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).8The Executive must be able to rely on the office's decision-making powers to effectively and successfully wage war. While the political structure of the United States will always leave the Executive branchsubject to being second-guessed by Congress, and will always remain accountable to the people, the office's unitary decision-making power and expediency are tailor-made for military doctrine and interrogations.9When the policies and execution of the nation's laws and military operations do not exactly conform to the will of Congress, this does not mean that the Executive lacks power to implement the political decisions made.10 Instead, the conflict raises the matter of separation of powers, a struggle existing since the nation's inception.11 Discerning the superiority of power in governing military operations, particularly when the Executive's position is contrary to that of Congress, is neither clear nor easy.12This article discusses the issue of control over the military and its operations between the Executive and Congress, an issue not new to American politics.13 The study finds its base in Articles I and II of the Constitution,14 and examines the historical precedence of congressional and Executive powers, including the Executive's inherent authority.15 As expected, the Framers' construct creates an area of concurrent authority between the Executive and Congress with respect to governance of the U.S. Armed Forces, as both branches enjoy such enumerated powers.16The deductive exercise shows that the Supreme Court and history provide support for the Executive's superior authority in governing how the military conducts its operations, including development and implementation of its doctrine.17 Consequently, this analysis concludes that the Executive possesses greater constitutional authority as theCommander in Chief and guardian of the Constitution than Congress regarding the control of military operations and its corresponding doctrine.18II. The Role of Doctrine in Military OperationsThe DOD defines military doctrine as "[f]undamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritat...See the full content of this document
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