The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with Commercial Communication Satellite Signals

AuthorSarah M. Mountin
PositionB.S., University of Wisconsin- Madison; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School; L.L.M., McGill University, Institute of Air and Space Law
Pages103-197
Legality of Interference with Commercial Satellite Signals Vol. 90
103
C
I
The Legality and Implications of
Intentional Interference with Commercial
Communication Satellite Signals
Sarah M. Mountin*
I. INTRODUCTION
ommercial communication satellite systems have become essential and
ubiquitous elements of almost every aspect of modern life.
1 Both civilian
and military sectors2 increasingly rely on satellites to advance important so-
cial, economic and military goals. Global communications are part of and
inextricably tied to national and international economies, critical State and
global infrastructures, national and international business, banking and fi-
nancial systems, air traffic control, electricity grids, early warning systems
and the mass media, as well as fully integrated into national security pro-
grams and military operations.3 The space systems advancing these vital
objectives and achieving these wide-ranging effects, however, are vulnera-
*B.S., University of Wisconsin- Madison; J.D., University of Wisco nsin Law School;
L.L.M., McGill University, Institute of Air and Space Law. The author is currently the
Chief of Space Law for United States Strategic Command at Offu tt Air Force Base, Ne-
braska. The views and o pinions expressed in this a rticle are those of the author alone and
do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of Defense, the United
States Air Force, or any other government agency.
1. David A. Koplow, AS AT-isfaction: Customary International La w and the Regulation of
Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1187, 1190
(2009).
2. Deborah Housen-C ouriel, Disruption of Satellite Transmissions ad Bellum and in Bello:
Launching a New Paradigm of Convergence, 45 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 431 (2012).
3. LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATION-
AL LAW 1 (1998); Housen-Couriel, supra note 2, at 437.
International Law Studies 2014
104
ble. Their signal transmissions can be disrupted by unintentional, accidental
or feckless operator errors, equipment malfunctions, poorly installed
equipment, inadvertent misuse or uncoordinated use of the already con-
gested radio frequency spectrum.
4
More ominously, as this article will discuss, satellite signals have be-
come increasingly attractive targets for intentional interference (the deliber-
ate targeting and disruption of satellite signals intended to interrupt, de-
grade or limit the performance of the targeted signal) such as deliberate
jamming5 by State and non-State6 actors.7 “Jamming,” a type of intentional
interference, involves overloading targeted radio frequencies with so much
electronic noise that communications cannot get through to their intended
destinations.8 Interference and disruptive jamming effects are accomplished
non-kinetically and disturb the communications of the satellites (radio
waves or links) on Earth and to and from satellites based in space.9 Disrup-
tions may also result from physical destruction of a satellite or ground sta-
tions relaying satellite transmissions.
Commercial communication satellite capabilities enable many compo-
nents of modern societies. The strengths secured by these new advanced
systems, however, means that their vulnerabilities serve as modern-day
Achilles heels. So while more and more State and non-State entities depend
4. Ram Jakhu & Karan Singh, Space Security and Competition for Radio Frequencies and G eo-
stationary Slots, 58 ZLW 79, 8385 (2009); Mike Gruss, Panel Ties U.S. Troop Rotations to
Satellite Interference Spikes, SPACE NEWS (June 24, 2013), http://www.spacenews.com/art
icle/military-space/35948military-satellite-communications-panel-ties-us-troop-rotations-
to#.Ue254RZsWR8; Ram Jakhu, Presentation delivere d at the Radio Frequency Interfer-
ence & Space Sustainability Panel Discussion, Washington, DC : Satellites: Unintentional
and Intentional Interference (June 17, 2013) [hereinafter Jahku, Satellites].
5. JAMES G. SAVAGE, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION 134 (1989).
6. For example, the Falun Gong, a banned spiritual movement in China, has repeate d-
ly jammed satellites based in China and Hong Kong and broadcast its own message. See
Falun Gong Jams Official Chinese TV, WASHINGTON POST (July 9, 2002), http://articles.chic
agotribune.com/2002-07-09/news/0207090078_1_falun-gong-li-hongzhi-hong-ko ng-
based-human-rights-group.
7. HANK RAUSCH, JAMMING COMMERCIAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS DURING
WARTIME: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH IEEE INTERNATION-
AL WORKSHOP ON INFORMATION ASSURANCE, 2006 (2006).
8. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 134.
9. Housen-Couriel, supra note 2, at 436.
Legality of Interference with Commercial Satellite Signals Vol. 90
105
on high-capacity satellite communications,
10 the electromagnetic waves car-
rying data that underlie communications lack adequate protections against
deliberate interference and jamming.11 Now the number of interference and
jamming incidents are growing dramatically12 and the frequency of such
events is accelerating, as is the range of actors capable of exploiting signal
vulnerabilities.
As this article will describe, modern-day satellite jamming often in-
volves using crude techniques, sloppy in their application. Jamming intend-
ed for one signal often disrupts other signals.13 For example, when the Lib-
yan government jammed two telecommunication satellites in 2007, dozens
of television and radio stations serving Britain and Europe were knocked
off the air and American diplomatic, military and FBI communications
were severely disrupted.14
Moreover, even though more than 80 percent of satellite jamming inci-
dents historically have been precipitated by diplomatic and political differ-
ences among nations,15 jamming is increasingly being employed to control,
deny and degrade information needed for strategic, economic and military
purposes.16 Jamming is especially troublesome for the U.S. military because
it relies on dual-use commercial satellites for 80 to 90 percent of its satellite
communications needs.17 Jamming also poses challenges for States when
the effects are generated within their borders or by it s citizens. As this arti-
cle will describe, States may be held responsible for failing to contain and
constrain jamming activities under international law and “States directly
menaced [by jamming] can reasonably be expected to take measures against
10. Ronald C. Wilgenbusch & Alan Heisig, Command and Control Vulnerabilities to Com-
munications Jamming, 69 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 56, 57 (2013), available at http://www.ndu
.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-69/JFQ-69_toc.pdf.
11. Id. at 57.
12. Gruss, supra note 4.
13. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 135.
14. Matthew Kleiman & Sonia McNeil, Red Lines in Outer Space, THE SPACE REVIEW
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2038/1.
15. Mohamma d Ghazai, Satellite Channel Jamming Rose Sharply After Arab Spring, JOR-
DAN TIMES (May 15, 2013), http://jord antimes.com/satellite-channel-jamming-rose-
sharply-after-arab-spring.
16. Jakhu, Satellites, supra note 4.
17. Loren B. Thompson, Lack of Protected Satellite Communications Could Mean Defeat for
Joint Force in Future War, LEXINGTON INSTITUTE EARLY WARNING BLOG (Apr. 14, 2010),
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/lack-of-protected-satellite-communications-could -
mean-defeat-for-joint-force-in-future-war.

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