Religious inquisition as social policy: the persecution of the 'Zanadiqa' in the early Abbasid Caliphate.

• Author: Ibrahim, Mahmood

INTRODUCTION

IT IS COMMONLY SAID THAT ISLAM IS "DIN WA DAWLA" to convey the statement that in Islam theology and politics are inextricably intertwined. (Din is translated as theology in order to avoid the restrictive meaning the term religion conveys in the modern West where religion is clearly always distinct from politics.) According to an accepted interpretation of this connection, Islam provides a set of rules, regulations, ethics, and laws which govern the Umma's social, economic and political processes. The Shari'a (Islamic law) is divided into 'Ibadat (matters related to worship or religion) and Mu'amalat (matters related to transactions or politics). This relationship implies that politics is always influenced by theology. To put it differently, Islam is conceptually the strictly defined context which determines the interplay between politics and theology. At least two indisputable facts in Islamic history shed a different light on the nature of this connection: 1.) Islamic law, theology, and political institutions are not static. They evolved through history as Islamic society developed and acquired needs and addressed issues that were not present or were not considered pressing for earlier generations of Muslims. Not only conflicting views of political power emerged, but also dogmas underwent a definable development when many theological questions were raised without a consensus as to their answers. 2.) Certain political and economic institutions developed outside of the bounds of religion, such as the office of Sultan as a governing military position, and the practice of Iqta' (land-grants) as a politico-economic system. Having emerged to address "secular" needs, religious scholars, Ulama', established religious bases for them. Islamic political theory, as expounded by al-Mawardi, for example, often appears as a justification of a de facto practice.(1) These observations compel us to reexamine the interactive relations between theology and Islamic politics by clarifying the determining factors in, and the social forces behind, their relationship. Such clarification will aid us in our endeavor for a more accurate reading of Islamic history. It will also hopefully provide the conceptual framework within which issues that challenge Muslim societies today can be effectively tackled.

It is within the larger context of the connection between theology and historical development that I approach my study of early Islamic history. For example, Islam's immediate background was greatly influenced by merchants who were socially dominant and by commerce as the main economic activity. Born in a mercantile society, Islam provided solutions to problems that Meccan merchants faced at the turn of the Seventh Century A.D. Thanks to the supportive ideological and institutional structure provided by Islam, merchants prospered economically and politically and commerce expanded throughout the Caliphate.(2)

After nearly a century of Umayyad rule, the Abbasids took over the state as the former were unable to adapt it to the changing realities of Islamic society. The first Abbasid century saw an even greater expansion of commerce. Yet, by the Third Century A.H/9th A.D. merchants lost their political predominance in favor of a revived landed class as the Caliphate began to use Iqta' in a more systematic fashion in the administration of its domain. Henceforward, the society, the office of the Caliph, and many of the institutions and practices acquired different characteristics. New institutions and offices were introduced. This also suggests a new periodization of Islamic history. Two main periods seem to stand out: a commercially based capitalistic period leading to an agrarian based semi-feudal one beginning with the Caliphate of al-Mutawakkil (847 A.D.) who inaugurated the use of administrative iqta' and relied on a land-based bureaucracy.(3)

The transition from one dominant elite to another as a significant feature of this periodization did not proceed without much controversy as the two sides (merchants vs. landlords) articulated their positions within a religious framework. This transition provided the context for theological arguments very much as social strife which followed the murder of Uthman provided the genesis of theological disputes among Muslims.

The state entered into the controversy by supporting one side against the other. The Umayyads, for example, encouraged the Murji'a and suppressed advocates of qadar (man's ability to act). Another aspect of the interplay between the state and theology was in the form of religious inquisition (Arabic mihna). There are two instances when such inquisitions were carried out in the first century of the Abbasid Caliphate, the one started by al-Mahdi in 780 A.D. and the other by al-Ma'mun in 832 A.D.

Concentrating on the first instance, it is said that the chief characteristic of the victims of al-Mahdi's inquisition was their presumed advocacy of Manichaean dualist tendencies instead of the strict monotheism of Islam. Hence, they were accused of heresy and were charged with zandaqa, a word of Persian etymology. Was this action an example of official religious persecution or "national" conflict? Was it an enforcement of a particular "orthodox" view of Islam or did it also have socio-political implications? The intention of this essay is to show that the inquisition, far from being religiously or ethnically motivated, was carried out for political purposes and that it documents the initial stage of the ascendancy of the landed aristocracy and the transition in the Islamic ruling elite. Seen in this light, the attack against the Zanadiqa provides further clues in explaining the interplay between theology and politics, and identifies the social forces that competed for the definition of the state and consequently influenced the course of theological development.

AL-MAHDI'S INQUISITION

Abu 'Abdallah Muhammad al-Mahdi, the third Abbasid Caliph, succeeded his father in 775 A.D. without opposition.(4) As Caliph, al-Mahdi made it a priority to reconcile the 'Alids who could potentially serve as leaders of an opposition. Another priority was to carry out various public works such as the enlargement of mosques already in existence, building new ones, expanding the water supply on the pilgrimage road, etc.(5)

On the whole, the Caliphate of al-Mahdi was peaceful and prosperous and, with the exception of the lingering rebellion of al-Muqanna', internal peace was enjoyed by all. All, that is, except for a group of people who were charged with zandaqa. It was a charge of heresy as the Zanadiqa were accused of articulating positions, and writing tracts, that advocated the Manichaean doctrine of the duality of eternals. Rather than charge them with ilhad (heresy), kufr (unbelief), or ridda (apostasy) which had been widely used in theological argumentation, al-Mahdi revived the very Persian/Zoroastrian designation for the Manichaeans. The significance of utilizing a Persian term, not the more familiar Arabic ones, will become apparent as the discussion of this event unfolds below.

Beginning in 780 and while in Aleppo, al-Mahdi started a policy of persecution which would last for the rest of his reign and that of his successor, al-Hadi, and until a general amnesty was proclaimed by Harun al-Rashid. Al-Mahdi set up a special office in charge of this persecution. The official, known as Sahib al-Zanadiqa, would examine the "suspects," some of whom were reportedly executed. From the apparent account, and according to the current understanding of this event, al-Mahdi's inquisition was directed against former Manichaean Muslims and their ideas which were popularized through the service of Persians and persianized Arameans. Since Manichaeans were not given Dhimmi status like other established religious groups,(6) their conversion to Islam had presumably been without much conviction and mainly in order to keep their employment in the Abbasid administration.(7) Nonetheless, they quickly came to constitute a powerful pressure group at the Abbasid court.(8)

As indicated above, the official charge against those persecuted was zandaqa, the individual was labeled zindiq. The word zindiq is the Arabicized form of the Middle Persian word zandik (followers of Zand). It was the Persian designation to The followers of Mani, founder of Manichaeism.(9) However, the term acquired a wider use during the Abbasid period to include not only those who preached heresies deemed to be a threat to the state and to Islam, but also those who exhibited irreverence toward The Shari'a, and libertarian tendencies.(10) In this category were many well known poets, such as Bashshar ibn Burd, Hammad Ajrad, Ishaq ibn Khalaf, and many others.(11) Poets accused each other of zandaqa. Thus, Bashshar accused Hammad while Hammad claimed that 'Amara ibn Harbiyya was a zindiq. Hammad ibn al-Zibirqan also accused Hammad al-Rawiya as did Abu al-Shamaqmaq to Jamil ibn Mahfuz.(12) That public morality was at stake perhaps explains why the person usually appointed as the Sahib (or 'Arif) al-Zanadiqa was the Muhtasib - market inspector - of the town, such as 'Abd al-Jabbar of Aleppo and his successor 'Umar al-Kalwadhi, as well as Hamdawayh Muhammad ibn Isa al-Maysani of Baghdad.(13)

The frivolity with which the poets considered zandaqa notwithstanding, to be a zindiq was an offense punishable by death. When a rumor concerning a suspected person reached the Sahib al-Zanadiqa (or Sahib al-Khabar), he would begin his investigation by observing the individual. If the inquisitor became convinced, he would arrest the suspect, bring him before the Caliph who would interrogate him and demand his repentance. If the suspect refused, he was executed.(14)

Apart from Bashshar ibn Burd, a known Shi'ite sympathizer, other executions took place. A well known case was the son of Abu 'Ubaydallah, that is Muhammad (or Marwan) ibn Abi 'Ubaydallah. Abu...