Extract
Stop to the Hague: internal versus external factors suppressing the advancement of the rule of law in Serbia.
I. INTRODUCTION
Indicted war criminals led at least three of the political parties vying for support in Serbia's parliamentary elections in December 2003, the first held since the downfall of former leader Slobodan Milosevic. While Milosevic's own Socialist Party (SPS) received seven percent of the vote, indicted war criminal Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party (SRS) received twenty-eight percent of total votes. (1) In casting a ballot for the SRS, over a quarter of the Serbian voting population formally registered their support for a party calling for an end to Western-style reforms and the return of Serbian troops to Kosovo. Moreover, they implied their acceptance of Seselj, an individual who has been awaiting trial at The Hague on charges of murder, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity. Seselj is also suspected of having links to former Prime Minister Zoran Djinjdic's assassins, individuals from the organized crime group the Zemun Clan who developed a conspiracy, called "Stop to the Hague," under which they hoped to use the murder of the Prime Minister to gain control of Serbia. (2) Moreover, the Serbian populace reaffirmed their support for Seselj's party in presidential elections in June 2004 and local elections in September 2004. In each of these elections, the SRS came in a close second behind current President Boris Tadic's Democratic party. (3) In reviewing these results, Serbian political leaders are quick to point to international pressure to comply with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as the core reason behind this nationalist upswing and the problems plaguing their government. They argue that "the ICTY has been designed in a biased and unfair manner, serving the interests of powerful western states and international organizations at the expense of local (Serbian) interests." (4) However, others counter by emphasizing that these recent voting patterns in Serbia and the rising strength of nationalism reflect the dissatisfaction of Serb citizens with their standard of living and the current government's inability to quell the powerful role of corruption and organized crime in Serbia. These individuals stress, in particular, the enduring role of political-criminal networks, remnants of the Milosevic era, which have stalled establishment of the rule of law and democratic reform in Serbia. This link between the mafia and the government, and the rising strength of these organized crime groups as a result of their political connections, have generated several negative consequences for democratic consolidation in Serbia. (5) The backlash has "included intimidation and blackmail of reformist politicians and judges, protection of war criminals, and obstruction of efforts to gather evidence" about war crimes. (6) Furthermore, these ICTY proponents argue that the tribunal's problems are limited to issues of execution and procedure. (7) The conflict between those who blame Serbia's struggle with nationalism on external forces mandating Hague compliance versus those who emphasize the Serbian government's inability to stop corruption and implement the rule of law has stalled reform in Serbia and weakened the state's transition to democracy. This Article will explore Serbia's current political status; the interconnection between the government, organized crime, and corruption; the contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to the state's democratic malaise; and will provide recommendations for advancing Serbia's adoption of the rule of law. Overall, this Article will argue that Serbia's stalled reform is the result of both internal and external factors: first, Belgrade's inability to confront internal problems, including reigning in corrupt security services and organized crime groups with links to indicted war criminals; and, second, the international community's failure to initiate popular support for th...See the full content of this document
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