"Americanizing the Spice Isle's schools: educational development in post-invasion Grenada".

• Author: Zakula, Robert G.

Introduction

Grenada, a small nation in the Eastern Caribbean, was caught up in the Cold War. From 1979-83, the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG), led by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, attempted a socialist transformation of Grenada. On the one hand, the PRG made progress in social services through state-led programs, most importantly health and education. On the other, the state committed human rights abuses and repressed political freedoms. Over these four years, the island's revolution was jeopardized by the PRG's relations with other socialist states, like Cuba and the Soviet Union. The island was in the United States' "backyard" as well. On October 19, 1983, in a coup led by PRG hard-liners, Bishop, his civilian supporters, and several cabinet members were massacred. The U.S. saw in Grenada an opportunity to win a small victory in the Third World, and more so in Latin America. On October 25, President Ronald Reagan ordered a military operation to "rescue" American medical students and to establish a democratic government. (1) By some estimates, around 90% of Grenadians welcomed the invasion and supported a transition to democracy. (2)

This study argues that the U.S. used its "soft" power of foreign aid to work with Grenada in creating a consenting relationship to achieve progress based on an American model of development, which had mixed successes and unintended consequences. As the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, overarching goals were to improve and modernize Grenada through democratic politics and a western-style free market system, but also to show that social development was more effectively accomplished through private entities rather than top-down, state-led efforts. This process directly shaped the island's infrastructure. On the whole, post-invasion investments from the U.S. government were estimated at $120 million or more. (3) Private contributions provided further additional funds to the project.

Although the U.S. assisted Grenada on multiple areas within its society, this article specifically examines Grenada's experience with post-invasion education development. It addresses particular actions to undo the revolution and the Grenada government's limited alternatives. More so, U.S. initiatives, both government and private, are an incredibly important focus. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Peace Corps, corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and non-profits played a major role in attempting to shape the island's education sector along American lines. Most education programs were positive. Some of the most successful ones were implemented by private organizations and development workers who operated on the ground alongside the islanders. Their work improved learning environments, school conditions, literacy, and teacher training. As a result, many Grenadians became attracted to the American model of social development. In the short term, this model worked. But when U.S. funding ended, some programs became unsustainable. The results were quite ironic--American altruism and the desire to institute self-reliance left a small nation with some untenable policies and furthered its dependency after the Cold War ended. Thus, the island essentially relied on external assistance for numerous objectives in education.

Within the international dynamics of the Cold War, Grenada's post-invasion relationship with the U.S. mirrored many aspects of other developing nations, willing to accept assistance in support of the global crusade against communism. However, within the by and large unpleasant history of American policy toward Latin American and the Caribbean, the Grenadian experience was inconsistent and a unique story of cooperation. While some Latin American nations pledged support, many were undemocratic--hardly models the U.S. could point to in terms of accomplishments. The Reagan administration's inconsistencies toward the region were characterized by its perilous decisions to fund the Contra war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and prolong pyrrhic civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala. (4) In contrast, the majority of Grenadians openly welcomed the American presence, and they had the agency to go along with the suggested development programs. American officials saw Grenada as a model for modernization for other developing nations and determined success by the effectiveness of the projects on the island itself, if Grenadians bought into them, and whether this development influenced Grenada's neighbors. Yet, the Grenadian model never extended beyond the confines of the Eastern Caribbean. Some surrounding islands were attracted to the post-invasion development scheme, but this was limited. Notwithstanding the drawbacks with some modernization programs, the majority of successes stayed on Grenada.

Historiography

Many historians assume that U.S.-Grenada relations declined after the invasion or ignore this period altogether. Most general histories examine only the Grenada Revolution and the subsequent U.S. invasion, while only some studies explore the establishment of a political democracy. Thus, few scholars have focused on U.S. involvement in post-invasion Grenada and its influence on the island's development. Perhaps this is due to the fact that Grenada is a small island nation with a weak economy and few international markets--with the exception of its nutmeg and tourism. As a result, Grenada tends to be forgotten within the pages of history and is understudied by historians of foreign relations. Despite relative scholarly neglect, however, there are important contextual and theoretical works relevant to Grenada. Russell Crandall's Gunboat Democracy claims that the intervention was ultimately a good thing for Grenada in that it established a political democracy. (5) In contrast, James Ferguson's Revolution in Reverse argues that the U.S. invasion was an imperial agenda that brought nothing but economic troubles to the island. (6) This study attempts to strike a balance to these views by exploring what Grenadians went through themselves. It also draws from Anton De Grauwe's "Education and Political Change," one of few sources that addresses postinvasion officials' approaches, flaws, and nominal gains in the social sector. (7)

Furthermore, drawing upon Nick Cullather's thoughts on modernization, new scholars are writing "about development without accepting its cliches, and to see the record of Americans' cynical, heroic, disastrous, and occasionally inspired attempts at global humanitarianism in all their moral and political complexity." (8) I attempt to tell a story that charts these new paths in historicism. David C. Engerman and Corinna R. Unger's "Toward a Global History of Modernization" argues for new foreign relations histories to be written on development through practical, ground-level approaches. (9) This article answers that call and explores Grenada's goals and programs through localized experiences. Lastly, Odd Arne Westad's thorough focus on Third World interventionism in The Global Cold War provides a broad connection in understanding the U.S.-Grenadian relationship. (10)

To conduct this study, it was necessary to use U.S. government and corporate documents. I heavily rely on development proposals and project reports to gauge how progress was perceived at the state and local levels. The oral histories I conducted with former Grenadian revolutionaries and government officials provide accounts on what happened to Grenada after 1983, along with periodicals I obtained during an on-site research trip. Perspectives on the post-invasion transformation are interspersed throughout this paper.

This study hopes to fill the historiographical gap on U.S.-Grenada relations after 1983 by examining America's influence on Grenada's post-invasion development through education. This study demonstrates that many Grenadians believed in the prosperity of western modernization and welcomed American initiatives. But it also shows that while there were improvements, some development efforts resulted in unforeseen costs and, ultimately, unsustainability after the Cold War ended. This article attempts to add new perspectives and material to the current historiography and further advances the story of post-invasion Grenada through narrow, localized development on the island. By using education as a model, I offer a lens into how development programs operated and the people it impacted, a current historical trend but also an area lacking in many works on foreign relations.

Anti-Communism

Following the U.S. intervention, the interim government carried out particular actions to undo the revolution and ended or reduced funding of particular PRG programs in public education. Post-invasion officials were in line with American goals and saw the PRG's education policies as projecting and enforcing a socialist political and ideological agenda. Cuts were also made for budgetary reasons. On a whole, spending on education was lower than under the PRG. Officials continued free milk and lunches policies, but only for impoverished students. Complimentary school uniforms were provided under the same conditions. Adult literacy also suffered a severe reduction in funding. The Centre for Popular Education, which stressed a socialist message, was renamed Adult Continuing Education. In all, most government-funded public education programs were decreased or discontinued, while the number of private and religious schools increased. (11)

In addition to the reduction in state-supported programs, the interim government embarked on an unofficial campaign to remove any trace of socialism within the island's society, especially in the educational sector. While the government's appointed Advisory Council members never declared or instituted a wholesale program to get rid of Grenadian radicals and communists, they targeted people and materials in schools and public...