Ambiguous argument as advocacy in organizational crisis communication.

• Author: Sellnow, Timothy L.

On January 13, 1993, the Washington State Health Department was alerted that doctors at Children's Hospital in Seattle were treating an unusually high number of children with E. coli infections - a form of food poisoning that is life-threatening to children. Robert Nugent, president of Jack in the Box, the fifth largest fast-food chain in the United States, was alerted two days later by the Washington State Health Department that the E. coli outbreak was at least partly attributed to hamburgers purchased at Jack in the Box restaurants. Upon receiving this alert, Jack in the Box executives dispatched a research team to Seattle. Within a month, three children in the Seattle area, all under three years of age, died of E. Coli 0157:H7 poisoning - the strain linked to Jack in the Box. One child had eaten at Jack in the Box, another was thought to have been infected by a child who had become ill after eating at Jack in the Box, and the source of the third child's infection was uncertain. In all, 400 people were infected with the bacteria in Washington State, Idaho and Nevada (Adelson, 1993). By February 6, 1993, the New York Times labeled the E. coli crisis Jack in the Box's "worst nightmare," reporting that shares of Foodmaker Incorporated, parent company of the Jack in the Boxchain, had "plunged, and the Securities Exchange Commission suspended trading in the stock, reopening it the following week" ("Jack in the Box's worst," 1993, p. 35).

As a result of this crisis, the Jack in the Box fast-food chain was not only in danger of losing sales, the company's very existence was threatened by the crisis as well. Sellnow (1993) describes the difficult situation surrounding organizational crises, "Not only must an organization respond quickly to an event that it could not or did not foresee, it must do so while under the pressure of an imposing loss of profit, legitimacy, or both" (p. 30). The sudden and severe nature of the E. coli crisis thrust Jack in the Box into a quagmire of uncertainty. Adding to this uncertainty was the diverse audience the company faced. Schuetz (1990) indicates that organizations facing crisis situations must address several audiences simultaneously. Jack in the Box officials faced a combined audience composed of consumers, regulatory agencies, stock holders, and doctors demanding explanations for the cause of a crisis about which the company knew little. For example, many, but not all, of the cases of E. coli poisoning were related to Jack in the Box. Moreover, some, but not all, Jack in the Box restaurants had spread the illness. Finally, if the company moved too quickly in accepting total responsibility for the poisonings, they were certain to face both consumer aversion and legal consequences. Weick (1988) offers a succinct summary of the situation facing organizations at the onset of a crisis by posing the following dilemma: "There is a delicate tradeoff between dangerous action which produces understanding and safe inaction which produces confusion" (p. 305). This study explores the public arguments Jack in the Box developed to both reduce and maintain elements of uncertainty in the E. coli crisis. Specifically, the study seeks to determine the extent to which ambiguity contributes to or detracts from an organization's ability to communicate with its diverse audiences during a crisis situation. For purposes of this study, we consider ambiguity in its broadest sense, including arguments that appear contradictory, vague, equivocal or indecisive. We contend that the form of ambiguity shared by the organization is, at least in part, dictated by the situation surrounding the crisis. Accordingly, a review of pertinent literature is provided along with an analysis of press releases issued by Jack in the Box during the months surrounding the crisis. The study concludes with a discussion of implications regarding organizational argument.

METHOD

Apologia

Studies of organizational crisis communication are frequently based upon Ware and Linkugel's (1973) work that established apologetic discourse as a genre (Benoit & Lindsey, 1987; Hoover, 1989; Ice, 1991; Schultz & Seeger, 1991). Ware and Linkugel identify four factors commonly found in speeches of self-defense. The first factor in Ware and Linkugel's typology, denial, "consists of the simple disavowal by the speaker of any participation in, relationship to, or positive sentiment toward whatever it is that repels the audience" (p. 276). The second factor, bolstering, is the obverse of denial. Bolstering involves the speakers' efforts to involve themselves with facts, sentiments, objects, or relationships which are "viewed favorably by the audience" (p. 277). Ware and Linkugel argue that denial and bolstering are reformative "in the sense that they do not alter the audience's meaning for the cognitive elements involved" (p. 426). The third factor, differentiation, "subsumes those strategies which serve the purpose of separating some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship from some larger context within which the audience presently views the attribute" (p. 278). In the case of differentiation, "at least one of the new constructs takes on a meaning distinctively different from that it possessed when viewed as a part of the old, homogeneous context" (p. 278). The final factor, transcendence, is the obverse of differentiation. Transcendence includes "any strategy which cognitively joins some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship with some larger context within which the audience does not presently view that attribute" (p. 280). Differentiation and transcendence are transformative in that they affect "the meaning which the audience attaches to the manipulated variable" (p. 280).

Ware and Linkugel indicate that speakers typically assume one of four major rhetorical postures when speaking in defense of themselves. They find that these postures involve the combination of a transformative factor and a reformative factor. An absolutive posture is composed of the combination of denial and differentiation. A vindicative posture includes denial and transcendence. An explanative posture combines bolstering and differentiation. Finally, a justificative posture emphasizes bolstering and transcendence (pp. 282-283).

Schultz and Seeger (1991) contend that when apologia is "expanded" from its typical focus on single speaker situations to be applied to "rhetoric which is corporate rather than individual centered" the critic must be sensitive to how the characteristics of corporate rhetoric differ from individual rhetoric (p. 51). They state, "While single speakers face multiple audiences, the modern corporation is unique in the degree of audience diversity and nature of their interests" (p. 51). They explain that while a single speaker may seek to appeal to as large an audience as possible, organizational survival depends on satisfying corporate audiences such as customers, stockholders, and regulatory agencies - the needs of which may actually contradict one another. Schuetz (1990) addresses the nature of this potential contradiction. She indicates that companies often structure a complex case in response to a crisis and direct different elements of the case to different audiences. Ironically, Schuetz claims that "in some cases, companies may advocate new policies and defend old ones in the same message" (p. 283). This tendency for distinct audiences to demand contrasting messages suggests that Ware and Linkugel's (1973) typology may not account for all of the strategies used by organizations facing crisis.

Benoit, Gullifor, and Pancini (1991) expand upon the work of Ware and Linkugel (1973) and others to develop a synthetic typology of image restoration strategies. Benoit and Brinson (1994) refine this typology and apply it to organizational crisis communication in a manner that addresses many of the concerns expressed above. They recognize that there are differences "in the defensive efforts waged by individuals and companies" (p. 76). For example, they acknowledge that statements made by an organization are decentered in that no identifiable individual is responsible for the message. Rather, the company speaks. In other words, many individuals may contribute to a single message that is attributed to the company. As such, assigning responsibility to individuals in a company for a given message or action becomes difficult. In addition, Benoit and Brinson explain that "organizations might favor different options than individuals, or employ strategies in different configurations" (p. 77). They propose a typology consisting of the following five general image restoration strategies: denial, evasion of responsibility, reduction of offensiveness of the event, mortification, and correction. It is important to note that Benoit and Brinson contend that these strategies are "intertwined" and that combinations of them can be used simultaneously (p. 87).

Benoit and Brinson (1994) expand Ware and Linkugel's (1973) view of denial by purporting that the accused "repudiates the accusation" or shifts blame to another source (p. 77). Evasion of responsibility occurs when "the accused does not deny committing the offense, but rather claims a lack of responsibility because the misdeed was a result of someone else's actions (provocation), a lack of information (defeasibility), an accident, or committed with good intentions" (p. 77).

Corporate advocates reduce the perceived offensiveness of the act with six variants. Three of these variants, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence, come from Ware and Linkugel's (1973) work. To these, Benoit and Brinson add...