Vol. 152 No. 2, December 2003
Index
- Corporate control transactions.
- Corporate constitutionalism: antitakeover charter provisions as precommitment.
- Corporate policy and the coherence of Delaware takeover law.
- Unregulable defenses and the perils of shareholder choice.
- The shareholder as Ulysses: some empirical evidence on why investors in public corporations tolerate board governance.
- Why firms adopt antitakeover arrangements.
- Institutional shareholders, private equity, and antitakeover protection at the IPO stage.
- Controlling controlling shareholders.
- Appraising the nonexistent: the Delaware courts' struggle with control premiums.
- Premiums in stock-for-stock mergers and some consequences in the law of director fiduciary duties.
- Creditors' ball: the "new" new corporate governance in Chapter 11.
- The new federalism of the American corporate governance system: preliminary reflections of two residents of one small state.
- Musings on the dynamics of corporate governance issues, director liability concerns, corporate control transactions, ethics, and federalism.